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
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The Spanish mood system  
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0. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

Many papers have been devoted to the treatment of the Spanish indicative and subjunctive. And many of the studies contained in these papers were aimed at arriving at one definition of the meaning of the subjunctive in all its different uses. In this paper, yet another attempt to provide a satisfactory description of the Spanish mood system, a different line of research is followed, based on the following assumptions:

- (i) Only in those contexts in which both indicative and subjunctive may appear under identical conditions may they be said to add to the meaning of the sentence in which they occur. This does not imply that their unique occurrence in other contexts is purely at random;
- (ii) There is no reason to assume *a priori* that the subjunctive is the marked member of the pair;
- (iii) The meaning of the subjunctive or indicative (in those cases in which they may be said to have a meaning of their own, cf. (i), should be determined from context to context, although the possibly different meanings of either of them in these different contexts may have certain elements in common.

The different problems related to the treatment of the mood system of Spanish will be addressed within the framework of Functional Grammar (FG). Some basic principles of this theory are presented in section 1. In section 2 I discuss some general issues related to the treatment of mood. In particular, I go into the notions "illocutionary force" and "modality" and argue that these notions pertain to different levels of the speech act, and that mood inflection may fulfil a distinguishing function at both levels. In 2.1 illocutionary force and its representation in FG as proposed by Dik (in prep.) is discussed separately. In 2.2 I

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address the question what kinds of modal distinctions a language may be expected to make in one way or another. I propose to distinguish three different types of modality and discuss the different modal distinctions to be made within each of these types. To conclude section 2 I present an adaptation of the clause model proposed by Dik (ibid.) and locate the three types of modality within this model. In section 3 I turn my attention to the Spanish data. The use of mood inflection in main clauses and embedded predications in Spanish is discussed in relation to illocutionary force (3.1), modal contexts (3.2), and non-modal contexts (3.3). In 3.4 the use of mood in relative clauses is touched upon, mainly in relation to the observations made in the preceding sections. The use of mood in adverbial clauses is not discussed separately, although some remarks are made on it in passing. In section 4 I return to the assumptions made at the beginning of this section and go into the relations between the different uses of the subjunctive and indicative.

To avoid possible confusion the term "mood" is used in this paper to refer to categories of verb inflection, while the term "mode" is used to refer to grammatical expressions of modality. Indicative and subjunctive verb inflection are marked (I) and (S) respectively.

## 1. SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES OF FUNCTIONAL GRAMMAR.

In FG, linguistic expressions are represented in underlying predications, in which the semantic, syntactic and pragmatic functions indicating the different relations holding between the participants in a State of Affairs (SoA) are represented. To form such an underlying predication, a predicate frame is selected from the lexicon. A predicate frame contains, among other things, a predicate, which may be either basic or derived, and a number of argument positions, each provided with a semantic function specifying the role the arguments fulfil in the SoA's designated by the predications built on the basis of this particular predicate frame. An example is:

(1) Build<sub>V</sub> (x<sub>1</sub>)<sub>Ag</sub> (x<sub>2</sub>)<sub>Go</sub>

In the argument positions of such a predicate frame terms are inserted. Terms are referring expressions, which may have a complex structure. Term insertion in the argument positions of (1) leads to, for instance:

(2) Build<sub>V</sub> (x<sub>i</sub>: John (x<sub>1</sub>))<sub>Ag</sub> (x<sub>j</sub>: his own house (x<sub>j</sub>))<sub>Go</sub>

No attention is given here to the internal structure of terms. Pragmatic functions may be assigned to the arguments to specify their informational status and syntactic functions to specify the perspective from which a SoA is presented. In the final expression through expression rules of underlying representations like (2) operators fulfil an important function. They should be regarded as abstract elements, representing the semantic and pragmatic distinctions coded in a language through grammatical means. Different types of operators are to be distinguished: term operators and predicate operators. The set of predicate operators consists of Tense, Mode, Aspect and Polarity operators. These operators represent grammatical distinctions which are coded on or near the predicate. The term 'Mode' is thus restricted to modality expressed through grammatical means.

According to FG, language should be regarded in the first place as an instrument of social interaction. Its aim is therefore to provide the means to explain specific linguistic phenomena, where possible, 'in terms of their functionality with respect to the ways they are used and to the ultimate purposes of these uses' and to devise a theory of the language system 'in such a way that it can most easily and realistically be incorporated into a wider pragmatic theory of verbal interaction' (Dik 1978:2).

Such a theory may be expected to be able to handle the linguistic means through which communicative intention and speaker's judgement are coded in a linguistic system. I hope to show that an adequate treatment of the Spanish mood system requires the incorporation of both levels.



## 2. ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE AND MODALITY

### 2.1 Introduction

Executing a speech act has been analyzed since Austin (1962) and Searle (1969) as requiring the execution of a number of subacts on the part of the speaker (S). Among these subacts are the illocutionary act and the propositional act. In uttering a sentence S not only offers a proposition to the Addressee (A), but also transmits his communicative intention. S has a number of linguistic means at his disposal to code the content or intention he wishes A to recognize in his utterance: proposition indicating elements at the level of the propositional act, and illocutionary force indicating devices at the level of the illocutionary act. The total of proposition indicating elements expresses the propositional content of an utterance. The total of illocutionary force indicating devices expresses the illocutionary force of an utterance. The different distinctions mentioned here are represented in (3):

|     |                     |                        |
|-----|---------------------|------------------------|
| (3) | Illocutionary act   | Propositional act      |
|     | Illocutionary force | Proposition indicating |
|     | indicating devices  | elements               |
|     | Illocutionary force | Propositional content  |

In what follows I use the term 'predication' instead of 'proposition', in line with the FG terminology introduced in section 1. Every utterance may thus be analyzed according to the following scheme (cf. Dik in prep.):

|     |                  |
|-----|------------------|
| (4) | ILL(predication) |
|-----|------------------|

Following Dik I use the term 'Clause' for any combination of a predication with an illocution, as represented in (4).

Mood inflection can be used both as an illocutionary force indicating device and as a proposition indicating element, as is shown for Spanish in section 3 (cf. also Bolkestein 1977, 1980).

In this chapter I first discuss both levels and their relation to mood inflection in general terms and then I go on to present a clause model in which both levels are represented.

## 2.1. Mood and illocutionary force

Illocutionary force indicating devices are those linguistic means through which S transmits his communicative intention. They may be subdivided into lexical and grammatical means. Performative verbs belong to the first category, whereas sentence order and mood belong to the second category. So, anticipating the data to be presented in section 3, an assertion in Spanish is executed most directly by using a performative verb like *asegurar* 'assure', the declarative sentence type and the indicative (I) mood:

- (5) Te aseguro que no es (I) culpa mia  
'I assure you that it's not my fault'

Performative verbs are mainly used to produce special effects (see Weijdema et al. 1982). Sentences like (6) are more common:

- (6) No es (I) culpa mia  
'It's not my fault'

The only difference between (5) and (6) is that (6) lacks the performative verb present in (5). And often S will intend (6) to be interpreted, like (5), as an assertion. Yet it is not possible to establish a direct relationship between illocutionary act and sentence type or mood. The use of these illocutionary force indicating devices in (6) does not necessarily imply that S intends his utterance to be interpreted as an assertion. A sentence like:

- (7) It's very cold in here

may for instance be uttered to produce the effect that A closes the window or turns up the heating, depending on the particular speech situation. To account for this fact, Weijdema et al. (1982) distinguish between:

- (8) (i) The illocution-for-the-speaker ( $ILL_S$ ): the illocution as intended by S.
- (ii) The illocution-of-the expression ( $ILL_E$ ): the illocution as coded in the linguistic expression.
- (iii) The illocution-for-the-addressee ( $ILL_A$ ): the illocution as interpreted by A.

According to Dik (in prep.)  $ILL_E$  is generally expressed by means of a number of sentence types, which he considers to be 'grammaticalised carriers of basic illocutions of linguistic expressions'.<sup>2</sup> He proposes to assign an operator representing  $ILL_E$  to predications. Such an operator triggers the expression rules which account for the formal realization of the different sentence types while at the same time providing the means to link  $ILL_E$  to  $ILL_S$ . In his view the communicative intention of S has relevance for linguistic description only in so far as linguistic means are used to code this intention in an expression. The fact that, for instance, declarative sentences may be used to make a request should then be explained within a wider pragmatic theory.

Searle's (1969) 'felicity conditions' might be a point of departure for this wider pragmatic theory, as they may shed some light on the question how A reconstructs S's intention, if that intention is not coded explicitly in the expression. The 'preparatory condition' for the act of making an assertion is, for instance, that the information contained in the assertion is not known by A. Suppose now S utters the following sentence:

(9) The window is open

in a situation in which A knows

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<sup>2</sup> See also Lyons (1977, ch.16) and Levinson (1983).

- (i) that the window is open;
- (ii) that S knows that he knows that the window is open;
- (iii) that S knows that he knows that S knows that the window is open.

In this situation it will be clear to A, as a consequence of S's violation of the condition, that S has another intention than making an assertion and he will try to reconstruct an alternative  $ILL_S$ . The fact that A has to apply a reconstruction model in which the primary steps concern the systematic check of the conditions associated with the speech act type most directly expressed in a declarative sentence stresses the fact that there is a conventional relationship between sentence type and speech act type. The following representations may now be used to represent direct and indirect speech acts respectively:

- |      |                     |                    |
|------|---------------------|--------------------|
| (10) | Direct speech act   | $ILL_S = ILL_E$    |
|      | Indirect speech act | $ILL_S \neq ILL_E$ |

The approach discussed here makes it possible to relate the use of a certain sentence type to the operators representing  $ILL_E$ . In 2.3 I will argue that the representation of sentence types in the form of 'illocutionary frames' might be more appropriate. This alternative approach does not affect the present discussion.

Most languages have at least the declarative, interrogative and imperative sentence type. The operators and their paraphrases proposed by Dik (in prep.) are:

- DECL: S wishes A to add the content of the linguistic expression to his pragmatic information.
- INT: S wishes A to provide him with the verbal information as requested in the linguistic expression.
- IMP: S wishes A to perform the action as specified in the linguistic expression.

These operators can be assigned to independent predications and to predications governed by a speech act verb. In the latter case

the subject of the speech act verb is the one who has performed the speech act in the embedded predication. Only in those cases in which S and the subject of the speech act verb are identical and the speech act verb is marked for present tense is the utterance performative. In all other cases an utterance is reported or repeated.

Dik further argues that languages may have a number of grammatical means to convert the basic illocution as expressed by a particular sentence type into a derived illocution. Examples of such 'grammatical converters' are tag questions, elements such as *please*, and alternative intonation patterns.

## 2.2. Mood and modality<sup>3</sup>

Modality, as opposed to illocution, pertains to the domain of propositional content (cf. 2.0). Lexical or grammatical elements giving expression to modal distinctions are part of the information S wishes to transmit when putting forward for consideration some predication, as I will show in some detail in 2.3. When mood inflection is used to express a modal distinction the term 'mode' is appropriate (cf. 1).

The different semantic distinctions generally subsumed under the heading 'modality' do not seem to represent a single and coherent semantic category. Instead of providing one definition of modality in general, I distinguish three types of modality and discuss the different kinds of modal distinctions to be made within each of these types. The different types of modality to be discussed in the following paragraphs may be defined as follows:

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<sup>3</sup> The distinction between three different types of modality presented in this section has been inspired by Lyons' (1977, ch.16-17) discussion of modality. Other sources of information on modal distinctions and their definitions which have been used are Allwood et al (1977), Bolkestein (1980), Chung & Timberlake (1985), Dik (in prep.), Foley & Van Valin (1984), and Mateus et al. (1983).

INHERENT MODALITY: All those linguistic means through which S can characterize the relation between a participant in a SoA and the realization of that SoA.<sup>4</sup>

OBJECTIVE MODALITY: All those linguistic means through which S can evaluate the actuality of a SoA in terms of his knowledge of possible SoA's.

EPISTEMOLOGICAL MODALITY: All those linguistic means through which S can express his commitment with regard to the truth of a proposition.

### 2.2.1. Inherent modality

The different distinctions to be made within this modality type are all SoA-internal, as follows from the definition given in the preceding paragraph. The only possible way to give expression to these distinctions is the use of a limited number of (derived) predicate frames. As, therefore, the treatment of this modality type cannot have any bearing on the use of mood inflection, I discuss it only briefly.

At least the following kinds of modal distinctions are to be distinguished within this modality type:

#### (i) Ability

Through the use of an ability predicate S reports that some participant in a SoA has the skills to perform a certain activity. To give an example:

(11) John is able to repair any kind of car

Several languages distinguish between *physical* ability and *acquired* ability. Compare the following Spanish examples:

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<sup>4</sup> Cf. Foley & Van Valin (1984).

- (12) Un pez puede nadar  
'A fish can swim'
- (13) Juan sabe nadar  
'Juan can (knows how to) swim'

(ii) *Obligation and permission*

Through the use of an obligation or a permission predicate S reports that some participant in a SoA is under obligation or has received permission to participate in some process or activity. Some examples:

- (14) John has to go to the hospital
- (15) John is free to go now

These kinds of obligation and permission should be distinguished from the ones to be discussed in relation to objective modality, although a certain diachronical relationship seems to hold between them. I return to this question in 2.2.4.

(iii) *Volition*

Through the use of a volition predicate S reports that some participant in a SoA intends, is willing to, hopes or wants to participate in some activity, process or situation. Some examples:

- (16) Ronald hopes to run for the presidency
- (17) Anthony is willing to get the job
- (18) Susan wants to be rich

This kind of volition is to be distinguished from the one to be discussed in relation to epistemological modality in 2.2.3.

The difference between objective and inherent modality is that in the latter modality type S cannot be said to evaluate a SoA in terms of his knowledge. Rather, he offers part of his knowledge

and presents some SoA as the actual situation obtaining in reality.

### 2.2.2. Objective modality

Linguistic means giving expression to objective modal distinctions can be regarded as the output of an evaluation process on the part of S with regard to the actuality status of a SoA. It is noted by Chung & Timberlake (1985:241) that 'whereas there is basically one way for an event to be actual, there are numerous ways that an event can be less than completely actual'. Typical actual SoA's are those designated by predications referring to the here-and-now and by predications governed by a verb of perception:

(19) Your new tie is over there

(20) I see you are wearing your new tie

One might simply assume that saying that a SoA is presented as actual is tantamount to saying that it is not modalized. In that case, however, it would be difficult to account for expressions through which S can make explicit that he regards the SoA under consideration to be identical to the situation obtaining in reality, such as it is the case that. Therefore, I include the distinction 'actual' in the category of objective modal distinctions. In the same way that a SoA can be presented as actual, it can be presented as simply non-actual, as in it is not the case that. But within the non-actual domain, many other distinctions can be made. To arrive at a further classification of these distinctions a closer look at the evaluation process underlying objective modality is in order. The knowledge on which S has to base his evaluation of a SoA may be subdivided into:

(21) TWO TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE

- (i) Knowledge of possible situations obtaining in S's conception of reality or of a hypothesized situation.
- (ii) Knowledge of possible situations relative to some system of moral, legal or social conventions.



The labels 'epistemic' and 'deontic' modality are generally used to cover the modal distinctions which depend on S's evaluation in terms of (i) and (ii) respectively.

Depending on the degree of compatibility of the SoA designated by a predication with S's knowledge of type (i) or (ii) the following ranges of possibility and permissibility can be established:

- (22) (i) Certain -Probable -Possible -Conceivable-  
Impossible  
(ii) Obligatory-Customary-Permissible-Acceptable -  
Forbidden

Some languages do not distinguish systematically between knowledge (i) and (ii), underlying the distinction between epistemic and deontic modality. The English modal *must* can be used to express both certainty and obligation, whereas *may* can be used to express both possibility and permission, although they do impose different restrictions on their complements in these different uses (See Bolkestein 1980, Goossens 1985). The multiple function of these modals seems to be conditioned by a similar degree of compatibility of the SoA under consideration with S's knowledge of one of the two types. One might ask, then, how this compatibility is measured. A possible answer to this question may be found if we return to the definitions given for the two types of knowledge in (21). It was indicated there that S's knowledge of possible situations is the standard for his epistemic or deontic evaluation of a SoA. These possible situations may be represented as combinations of related SoA's. I use the label 'State of the World' (SoW)<sup>5</sup> for each representation of a possible situation. S's evaluating a SoA may now be interpreted as his checking a SoA against SoW's. If all SoW's contain the SoA designated by a predication, then S will arrive at the conclusion 'certain' if he refers to his type (i) knowledge, or 'obligatory' if he refers to his type (ii) knowledge. If only some SoW's contain the SoA under

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Dik's (1986b) 'pictures'.

consideration, then S will arrive at the conclusion 'possible' if he refers to his type (i) knowledge, or 'permissible' if he refers to his type (ii) knowledge. Following this analysis, the following distinctions can be said to be roughly equivalent:

|      |              |                 |             |
|------|--------------|-----------------|-------------|
| (23) | SoA is       | SoW's in domain |             |
|      | contained in | (i)             | (ii)        |
|      | a. All       | Certain         | Obligatory  |
|      | b. Most      | Probable        | Customary   |
|      | c. Some      | Possible        | Permissible |
|      | d. Few       | Conceivable     | Acceptable  |
|      | e. No        | Impossible      | Forbidden   |
|      | f. ?         | Doubtful        |             |

Further distinctions can be made. If we assign the value 100 to (a) and 0 to (e), in principle any value in between them might be expressed, although one would not expect languages to have special devices to express, for instance, a value of 78.

'Doubtful' is analyzed in (23f) as S's expressing his inability to provide an evaluation in terms of his knowledge of the SoA under consideration. The fact that complements of adjectives like doubtful and verbs like doubt take the same form as embedded questions supports this analysis.

The different objective modal distinctions discussed are summarized in (24):

(24) OBJECTIVE MODALITY

|            |             |             |
|------------|-------------|-------------|
|            | Epistemic   | Deontic     |
| Actual     |             |             |
| Non actual | Certain     | Obligatory  |
|            | Probable    | Customary   |
|            | Possible    | Permissible |
|            | Conceivable | Acceptable  |
|            | Impossible  | Forbidden   |
|            | Doubtful    |             |

It follows from the analysis proposed here that elements expressing objective modality take a SoA as designated by a predication in their scope. This means that objective modality can be expressed through predicate operators or embedding predicates only.

To conclude this section I will briefly illustrate how the analysis proposed here may be extended to conditional sentences. It was argued that S bases his objective epistemic evaluation on his knowledge of possible situations obtaining in his conception of reality or of a hypothesized situation. Suppose now that S wishes to make a statement or ask a question about a hypothesized situation. In that case he should make explicit what situation he is referring to in order for A to be able to correctly interpret his statement or question. This hypothesized situation, or, in other words, the condition, is presented as a SoA which may itself be evaluated epistemically. For instance, S may hypothesize a situation which to his knowledge will probably never obtain in reality and may still make statements or ask questions about things happening in that situation. So both condition and consequent may be evaluated epistemically: the condition in terms of S's knowledge of the possible situations obtaining in his conception of reality, the consequent in terms of his knowledge of possible situations obtaining in the hypothesized universe specified by the condition. No special devices for the representation of the conditions of potential and counterfactual conditional sentences are needed if they are dealt with in the following way:

(25)  $(x_i : [ \begin{smallmatrix} \text{Poss} \\ \text{Non-act} \end{smallmatrix} \text{Pred}_\beta (x_1) (x_2) \dots (x_3) ] (x_i))_{\text{Cond}}$

as exemplified by the conditions in:

(26) If he  $\begin{smallmatrix} \text{comes} \\ \text{came} \end{smallmatrix}$ , (I  $\begin{smallmatrix} \text{won't} \\ \text{wouldn't} \end{smallmatrix}$  open the door)

The condition may take the form of an instruction to A to imagine the hypothesized situation when answering a question, as in:

(27) Suppose he <sup>comes</sup> came, (what <sup>will</sup> would you do?)

In both cases, the potential or counterfactual character of the conditional is reflected in the verb inflection of both the condition and the consequent.

Having established the hypothesized situation, S may evaluate the actuality of the SoA designated by the consequent in terms of his knowledge of possible situations obtaining in his conception of the hypothesized universe, as in:

(28) If you hadn't lost your job, it would have been possible to make ends meet

### 2.2.3. Epistemological modality

To start my discussion of epistemological modality, I will go into the differences between subjective modality, in my view a subcategory of epistemological modality, and objective modality. These differences have been discussed by Lyons (1977, chs. 16, 17), Bolkestein (1980) and Palmer (1983), among others. Objective modality concerns S's evaluation of a SoA in terms of his knowledge, whereas subjective modality concerns S's expression of the degree of his commitment with regard to the truth of the content of the predication he puts forward for consideration, i.e. it modifies a statement. Modal adverbs always give expression to subjective modality, modal adjectives to objective modality. Some of the main differences between objectively and subjectively modalized predications are:

(1) Objectively modalized predications can be questioned, subjectively modalized ones cannot:

(29) Is it possible that John will come?

(30) \*Possibly John will come?

(ii) Objectively modalized predications can be hypothesized in a conditional sentence, subjectively modalized ones cannot:

(31) If it is possible that John will come, I am going home

(32) \*If possibly John will come, I am going home

(iii) Subjective modality can be formulated in positive terms only:

(33) \*Impossibly John will come

(34) \*Uncertainly John will come

The non-existence of negative modal adverbs corresponds with the fact that the English modals, when used to give expression to subjective modality, cannot appear under negation:

(35) \*John may-not be ill

(36) \*John mustn't be ill

Objective modality can be formulated in both positive and negative terms:

(37) It is impossible that John will come

(38) It is not certain that John will come

(iv) Subjective modality is bound to the moment of speaking, objective modality is not. Although some of the English modals which can be used to express subjective modality can take the past tense form, this form never has temporal reference but rather expresses a higher degree of reservation on the part of S (see 3.2.2.3.):

(39) It may/might be true

Past tense inflection on modal adjectives does have temporal reference:

(40) It was possible that John would come, so I  
went home

(v) In reaction to an objectively modalized predication the source of the information contained in that predication may be questioned:

(41) A: It is possible that it will rain tomorrow  
B: Who says so?

The same question would seem clearly out of place as a reaction to a subjectively modalized predication:

(42) A: Possibly it will rain tomorrow  
B: \*Who says so?

An appropriate reaction would be:

(43) B: Do you think so?

These differences indicate that subjective modality should be located outside the predication proper, i.e. outside the scope of tense and negation, and protected from the possibility of being hypothesized. Furthermore, the interpretation of subjective modality as concerning the expression of S's commitment with regard to the truth of the content of the predication is confirmed by the fact that it is impossible to question a subjectively modalized predication. Characteristic for questions is the absence of truth commitment on the part of S. As the question of truth value is irrelevant in the case of imperatives, subjective modality is restricted to declarative sentences. I will return to the formalization of subjective modality in 2.3 and for the time being represent subjective modality as expressing S's commitment with regard to the content of a predication as:

(44) C<sub>S</sub>(predication)

The difference between objective and subjective modality noted under (v) needs some closer attention. The fact that the source of a subjectively modalized predication cannot be questioned indicates that by subjectively modalizing a predication S reveals himself as the source, as the one who gives a judgement about the information contained in that predication. However, S is not the only possible source. Chung & Timberlake (1985) use the term 'epistemological mode' for those modal distinctions which '... evaluate the actuality of an event with respect to a source'. They do not explicitly include subjective modality within this category, but as illustrated by Foley & Van Valin (1984) evidentials do not behave differently from modal adverbs expressing subjective modality. There seems to be reason to speak of one modality type, the members of which have the presence of a source in common. The different modal distinctions mentioned by Chung & Timberlake (1985:244) are:

- (i) Inferential mode, '... in which the event is characterised as inferred from evidence.'
- (ii) Quotative mode, '... in which the event is reported from another source.'
- (iii) Experiential mode, '...in which the event is characterised as experienced by the source.'
- (iv) 'The submode in which the event is a construct (thought, belief, fantasy) of the source.'

The last, unlabeled category might receive the name 'subjective modality'. Within this category different subdistinctions can be made, expressing different degrees of commitment on the part of S. Partly these distinctions parallel the distinctions made within the category of objective epistemic modality. A decreasing degree of commitment is reflected in the following series of modal adverbs:

## (45) Certainly - Probably - Possibly

There appears to be a minimum to the degree of commitment S may express, as reflected in the ungrammaticality of *impossibly*. A possible explanation for this phenomenon might be that a less than minimal degree of commitment would be in conflict with the very act of asserting.

Apart from modal adverbs, the first person present tense forms of some verbs may be used to give expression to subjective modality, such as *I think*, *I suppose*.<sup>6</sup> Some differences in the syntactic behaviour of these forms as opposed to other forms of the same verb will be illustrated for Spanish in chapter 3. Impersonal expressions may be used for evidential, quotative and experiential modality. Examples are *It seems*, *It appears*.

I think at least one more category should be classified as a subjective modal distinction. S may also reveal himself as a source in expressing his wishes, hopes and desires. One might say that S expresses his emotional commitment in these cases. In different languages the close relationship between belief and hope, as representing the two different kinds of subjective modality, may be observed. Compare for instance the following Spanish sentences:

- (46)a Espero que vendrá (I)  
 'I expect he will come'  
 b Espero que venga (S)  
 'I hope he will come'

The same predicate is used in both sentences, which only differ in the mood inflection used in the complements. A comparable phenomenon may be observed in Hidatsa, to which I will turn my attention later.

The inclusion of volitional modality in the category of subjective modality provides the means to explain the existence and underlying structure of sentences like:

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<sup>6</sup>. Compare the following quote from Benveniste (1966): 'Est-ce-que je me decris croyant quand je dis je crois (que...)? Sûrement non. L'opération de pensée n'est nullement l'objet de l'énoncé;'



(47) I wish he came more often

This sentence is modalized in two ways: S expresses his wish for a certain situation to obtain while at the same time characterizing this situation as non actual. So, in a sense, S creates a domain to be evaluated in terms of his knowledge. Note that this means that there is some similarity between conditional sentences (see 2.2.2.) and sentences like (47). Anticipating the proposals to be made in 2.3 sentence (47) may be analyzed as modalized at two different levels, the subjective and the objective level (Des(ire) is used as a shorthand notation for volitional subjective modality):

(48) Des(Non-act Come<sub>v</sub> (x<sub>i</sub>: p3 (x<sub>i</sub>))<sub>Ag</sub> (y<sub>i</sub>: more often  
(y<sub>i</sub>))<sub>Freq</sub>)

Apart from a number of adverbs like *hopefully* the first person present tense forms of verbs like *wish*, *hope*, and *want* may be used to express volitional subjective modality. A problem in the analysis of the latter forms is that they are probably not only used in their 'world creating' sense but also in a self descriptive one. In the latter case they should rather be analyzed as expressing inherent modality (see 2.2.1.).

The different modal distinctions of the epistemological type may be summarized as follows:

(49) EPISTEMOLOGICAL MODALITY

|              |            |                               |
|--------------|------------|-------------------------------|
| Subjective   | Epistemic  | Certainty (Strong commitment) |
|              |            | Probability (Belief)          |
|              |            | Possibility (Weak commitment) |
|              | Volitional | Wishing, Hoping etc.          |
| Inferential  |            |                               |
| Quotative    |            |                               |
| Experiential |            |                               |

A language making extensive use of elements expressing epistemological modality is Hidatsa (Siouan, Matthews 1965). In Hidatsa all declarative sentences are obligatorily modalized epistemologically by means of a set of mode morphemes which are applied to main predications and to predications governed by verbs designating mental or verbal acts or cognition.<sup>7</sup> Except when subject raising is applied, these morphemes are the last one of the string, as in:

- (50) Wacéo úixi a áciwi ski  
 Man antelope he track strong commitment  
 'The man sure tracked an antelope'
- (51) Wio a ríiti rahe  
 Woman she hungry quotative  
 'I've been told that the woman is hungry'

Other mood morphemes are applied in the same way. The different morphemes are given in (52):

- (52) ski certainty: 'sure', 'certainly'  
 c probability: 'I think that', 'probably'  
 toak possibility: 'Perhaps'  
 wareac general knowledge: 'they say that'  
 rahe quotative: 'I've been told that'

The morpheme *c* is the least marked member of the set. In non declarative predications another set of morphemes is applied, including Optative, Imperative and Interrogative. An example is:

- (53) Rii ki xákao-hkéó ah  
 You yourself make.move optative  
 'May you make yourself move'

The fact that these two sets of morphemes are mutually exclusive and may occupy the same position in a sentence has a quite ob-

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<sup>7</sup>. These predicate types will be analyzed in chapter 3 as embedding a clause or a content phrase. Epistemological modality operates on content phrases.

vious explanation. Since only declarative sentences can be epistemologically modalized, the mode morphemes in Hidatsa make it sufficiently clear that a declarative is intended. Other sentence types cannot be epistemologically modalized. A morpheme is added to indicate their illocutionary status.

The relation between belief and desire, referred to earlier, is reflected in Hidatsa in the fact that sentences describing S's desires (or feelings) commonly take the mode that is also used to express S's belief, as in:

- (54) Wíi wa wíira i rakcí héo wa wáchéo c  
 Me I goose he roast sub I want mode  
 'I want to roast the goose'

#### 2.2.4. Discussion

In the preceding paragraphs three types of modality were discussed. The different ways in which these modality types were analyzed have their repercussions on the different ways in which they may be expressed. Inherent modality was analyzed as operating SoA-internally, Objective modality as operating on a SoA as designated by a predication, and epistemological modality as operating on the content of a statement. These different levels and the possible means of expression for the different modality types are represented in (55):

#### (55) MODALITY TYPES AND THEIR EXPRESSION

| Modality type    | Level             | Expression                       |                      |
|------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------|
|                  |                   | Lexical                          | Grammatical          |
| Inherent         | SoA               | (Derived) predicate              | ---                  |
| Objective        | $K_S(\text{SoA})$ | Embedding predicate              | Predicate operator   |
| Epistemo-logical | S(Predication)    | Embedding predicate<br>Adverbial | Predication operator |


Both objective and epistemological modality may be expressed through embedding predicates. In 2.3 it will be shown that there is a difference in what they embed.

As noted by Foley & Van Valin (1984), diachronic evidence suggests that inherent modal distinctions tend to be reinterpreted as objective modal distinctions, and these, in their turn, may be reinterpreted as epistemological modal distinctions. Goossens (1985) interprets this tendency as a development from facultative modality to deontic modality to epistemic modality. I think this phenomenon should rather be understood as a change of modality type, in the sense in which these are defined in this chapter. Some of the distinctions made within each of these types seem good candidates for reinterpretation in terms of specific distinctions made in other modality types. For instance, in different languages ability predicates are reinterpreted as expressing objective epistemic possibility. Objective epistemic possibility may be reinterpreted as subjective epistemic possibility, i.e. weak commitment. Inherent obligation is likely to be reinterpreted as objective obligation, a development which may be observed in the use of *have to* in American English (See Palmer 1983). In all these cases a change in modality type is involved, which, as will be shown in 2.3, may be described as a development from more inner to more outer layers of the clause.

### 2.3 A model for predication and clause


Returning to Searle's (1969) analysis of the speech act, some further subacts may be distinguished, as represented in (56):

(56) DECOMPOSITION OF THE SPEECH ACT



Using the terminology introduced earlier, the clause may be analyzed in an analogous way:

(57) DECOMPOSITION OF THE CLAUSE




As an alternative to the approach in which operators represent the basic illocutions of linguistic expressions (See 2.1), I would like to represent these as illocutionary frames, into which predications are inserted, resulting in structures like those given in (58):

- (58) DECL( $X_1$ : [predication] ( $X_1$ ))  
 INT( $X_1$ : [predication] ( $X_1$ ))  
 IMP( $X_1$ : [predication] ( $X_1$ ))

In this way, the two different levels of the decomposed clause in (57) may be handled in a comparable way: at the lowest level the narrated event is structured on the basis of a predicate frame; at the highest level the speech event is structured on the basis of an illocutionary frame, as in (59):

## (59) ILLOCUTIONARY AND PREDICATE FRAMES



An illocutionary frame should be regarded as expressed by the total of illocutionary force indicating devices of a clause, in particular the formal properties of the sentence type.

The four different levels given in (59) are:

|      |   |                     |
|------|---|---------------------|
| (60) | $\text{ILL}_E(X_1)$                         | Illocutionary frame |
|      | $(X_1)$                                     | Predication         |
|      | $\text{Pred}_\beta (x_1) (x_2) \dots (x_n)$ | Predicate frame     |
|      | $(x_1)$                                     | Term                |

Two aspects of this approach need some elaboration: The illocutionary frames themselves, and their 'arguments', represented by (X).

The (X)-variable introduced in the illocutionary frames is a content phrase variable. A predication in (X) represents a third order entity: the content of an utterance. The introduction of this variable makes it possible to distinguish between the two functions of predications: designating states of affairs at the level of the narrated event; and representing contents at the level of the speech event.\* Possibly (X) may also be taken to be the basic unit of knowledge, where knowledge is regarded as a set

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\*. Vet (1986) proposes the application of a SoA variable, which should not be identified with the content phrase variable introduced here.

of propositions (see Dik 1986a).<sup>9</sup> I will return to this question in my discussion of the Spanish data.

There are at least two parts of grammar in which a separate content phrase variable proves to be useful. Firstly, anaphoric reference may be made to full content phrases, as exemplified in (61):

- (61) A: The weather will be nice tomorrow  
B: Do you think so?

Anaphoric reference to full content phrases is expressed in English by means of *so*, as in (61b). The interchange in (61) may be represented as in (62):

- (62) A: DECL( $X_I$ : [Fut Nice<sub>A</sub> ( $x_i$ : the weather ( $x_i$ ))]<sub>φ</sub>  
( $x_j$ : tomorrow ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Temp</sub>] ( $X_I$ ))  
B: INT( $X_J$ : [Pres Think<sub>V</sub> ( $x_k$ : 2s ( $x_k$ ))]<sub>φExp</sub>  
( $AX_I$ )<sub>Go</sub>] ( $X_J$ ))

Secondly, the difference between belief *de re* and *de dicto* shows the necessity of the distinction between the two uses of predications. In Spanish, this difference is formally reflected in negative contexts, as will be shown in 3.2.2.1.

Some apparent advantages which follow from the representation of basic illocutions in the form of abstract illocutionary frames are the following:

- (1) Restrictions on the type of predication to be used with a specific  $ILL_E$  can be formulated as selection restrictions. For instance, only predications which designate +control SoA's may be used in imperative constructions, as in:

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
<sup>9</sup> If this analysis is correct, the paraphrase for DECL may be reformulated as: S wishes A to add S's unit of knowledge X to his pragmatic information. See p.8 above.

(63)  $IMP(X_1: [+control]) (X_1)$

- (ii) Illocutionary conversion can be dealt with by means of a set of illocutionary frame formation rules, paralleling the rules by means of which derived predicates are accounted for.
- (iii) The 'framing' analysis may be further expanded by considering clauses as the fundamental units to be inserted in narrative, argumentative, and discourse frames, thus providing a means to link syntactic description more accurately to other branches of language theory.

Inclusion of the adaptations proposed here in Dik's (1978) scheme for the organization of a Functional Grammar leads to the following configuration:

(64) ILLOCUTIONARY FRAMES IN FG





The psycholinguistic correlate of this scheme would be that S develops a communicative intention and chooses the form which, given the specific speech situation, suits him best, while at the same time choosing the adequate linguistic means to convey the content he wishes A to recognize. Although I do not know of psycholinguistic data which might support this analysis, it does seem quite plausible to me that the different subacts required of S in executing a speech act are executed simultaneously.

The clause model proposed here allows for the application of operators over four different layers:

|      |       |                  |                        |                         |  |                   |
|------|-------|------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|--|-------------------|
|      | 4     | 3                | 2                      | 1                       |  |                   |
| (65) | Oper. | ILL <sub>E</sub> | (Oper.X <sub>1</sub> : | [Oper.Pred <sub>β</sub> | (Oper.x <sub>1</sub> ) <sub>sf</sub> ] | (X <sub>1</sub> ) |

1. Term operators
2. Predicate operators
3. Predication operators
4. Illocutionary operators

Illocutionary operators represent grammatically reflected modifications of basic illocutions. Some Spanish examples will be given in 3.2.2.3. But first the different types of modality discussed earlier should be assigned a position in this configuration. As inherent modality can be expressed lexically only, I restrict myself to objective and epistemological modality. Objective modality has been characterized in terms of S's evaluation of the SoA designated by a predication, epistemological modality in terms of S's commitment with regard to the content of his statement. Given these characterizations of the two modality types, they may be assigned the positions in (66):

|      |                  |       |      |                   |   |                   |
|------|------------------|-------|------|-------------------|---|-------------------|
|      | Epist.           | Obj.  |      |                   |   |                   |
| (66) | ILL <sub>E</sub> | (Mod. | Mod. | Pred <sub>β</sub> | (x <sub>1</sub> ) (x <sub>2</sub> ) ... (x <sub>n</sub> ) | (X <sub>1</sub> ) |

Take, for instance, the following sentence in which linguistic means are applied to express inherent, objective and epistemological modality:

(67) It seems that it is possible that he can cure blindness

The underlying structure of this sentence, in a language in which both epistemological and objective modality are expressed through grammatical means, is represented in (68):

(68) DECL(Quot. $X_I$ : [PresPoss Can<sub>V</sub> Cure<sub>Vinf</sub> ( $x_1$ : p3 ( $x_1$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> ( $x_j$ : blindness ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Go</sub>] ( $X_I$ ))

In English, both objective and epistemological modality are expressed through lexical means. This may be represented as:

(69) DECL( $X_I$ : [Seem<sub>V</sub> ( $X_J$ : [Pres Possible<sub>A</sub> ( $x_1$ : [Can<sub>V</sub> Cure<sub>Vinf</sub> ( $x_j$ : p3 ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> ( $x_k$ : blindness ( $x_k$ ))<sub>Go</sub>] ( $x_1$ ))<sub>φ</sub>] ( $X_J$ ))<sub>φ</sub>] ( $X_I$ ))

Two differences in the syntactic behaviour of objectively and epistemologically modalized sentences in Spanish support the analysis of epistemological modality as a modality that should be assigned a position outside the predication proper, as opposed to objective modality, which has been assigned a position inside the predication.

Firstly, predicates expressing epistemological modality do not allow clitic promotion (see Aissen & Perlmutter 1976, Luján 1979), unlike verbs expressing objective modality. Compare epistemological *parecer* 'seem' in (70) with objectively used *deber* 'must' in (71):

- (70)a Parece saberlo poco  
 b \*Lo parece saber poco  
 'He seems to know little about it
- (71)a Debe querer hacerlo bien  
 b Lo debe querer hacer bien  
 'He must want to do it well'

Secondly, the two groups of predicates behave differently with regard to negative raising (see Luján 1979, Rivero 1979). This difference may be illustrated by means of sentences (72)-(73), which contain the preposition *hasta* 'until'. This preposition requires a negative context, a condition which is apparently not fulfilled in (72b):

- (72)a *Parece que no llega (I) hasta las diez*  
 'It seems that he will not arrive until ten'  
 b \**No parece que llega (I) hasta las diez*  
 'It doesn't seem that he will arrive until ten'
- (73)a *Es probable que no llegue (S) hasta las diez*  
 'It is probable that he will not arrive until ten'  
 b *No es probable que llegue (S) hasta las diez*  
 'It is not probable that he will arrive until ten'

An explanation for the ungrammaticality of (70b) and (72b) is that both the clitic and the negative element are part of the content phrase with regard to which S expresses his commitment. Promotion of the clitic or transportation of the negative element to a position outside the scope of the elements through which S expresses his commitment leaves a gap in this content phrase. Therefore (72b) and the non modalized (74) are ungrammatical for the same reason:

- (74) \**Llega (I) hasta las diez*  
 'He comes until ten'

The formal correlate of this restriction is that no element may pass the (X)-boundaries.<sup>10</sup> The restriction also holds the other way round. The (X)-boundary blocks the scope of negative elements situated outside the predication restricting (X), as will be illustrated for Spanish in 3. One could therefore say that (X) functions as an inseparable and closed unit.

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<sup>10</sup> Although subject raising seems to violate this restriction, it does not if it is regarded as the result of double syntactic function assignment in the underlying predication, as proposed in Dik (1979).

Further evidence for the correctness of the different positions I have assigned to the different modality types discussed may be derived from the order in which elements expressing modal distinctions of the three types appear in linguistic expressions. On the basis of observations in a number of languages<sup>11</sup> Foley & Van Valin (1984) arrive at the following model of the 'layered structure of the clause':

- (75) (IF(EVID(TENSE(STATUS[...(MOD[NP(NP)(ASPECT[Predicate]))]))))  
 IF= Illocutionary Force, EVID= Evidentials & Subjective modality, STATUS= ±Objective modality, MOD= ±Inherent modality.

The order in which the different modality types appear in their model is identical to the one I have given. One language in which this order is neatly reflected is Turkish. Consider the following example:<sup>12</sup>

- (76) Her müslüman Kur'ân-i Kerim-i okuy-abil-meli-ymiş  
 Every muslim Koran-conn Holy-acc read-able-obl-quot  
 'It seems that every muslim should be able to read the Koran'

Inherent modality is expressed by means of a derived stem *okuy-abil-*, produced by a productive predicate formation rule. To this stem two affixes are attached, one indicating moral obligation (*-meli*), and one indicating that S obtained the information from a third person (*-miş*). The order given in (76) is the only possible

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<sup>11</sup> Partly based on Bybee (1985).

<sup>12</sup> The distinction between predicate operators and predication operators in the sense in which they are used here was first made by Van Schaaik with respect to Turkish in a paper presented at the 'Symposium on predicate operators in Functional Grammar', held at the University of Amsterdam, June 1985. He provided me with examples (76)-(77).

one.<sup>19</sup> The same order holds if objective modality is expressed lexically, as in:

- (77) Her mōslūman-ın Kur'ân-ı Kerim-i okuy-abil-me-si  
 Every muslim-gen Koran-acc Holy-acc read-able-inf-poss  
 gerek-ir-miş  
 obligatory-tense-quot  
 'It seems that it is obligatory that every muslim is  
 able to read the Koran'

Two final remarks should be made with regard to the clause model proposed in this section. Firstly, the status of illocutionary adverbs should be accounted for. The following sentence, adapted from Foley & Van Valin (1984), apart from showing that the relative ordering of the different types of modality in Turkish also holds for English, illustrates that illocutionary adverbs modify the clause as a whole:

- (78) Frankly, it is certainly possible that John won't be  
 able to meet his sales target

The representation of (78) could be something like:

- (79) DECL( $X_I$ : [Certainly ( $X_J$ : [Pres Possible<sub>A</sub> ( $x_i$ : [FutNeg  
 Meet<sub>V</sub> ( $x_j$ : John ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> ( $x_k$ : his sales target ( $x_k$ ))]  
 ( $x_i$ ))<sub>φ</sub>] ( $X_I$ )))] ( $X_J$ )) ( $Y_I$ : [Frank<sub>A</sub> (S)<sub>φ</sub>] ( $Y_I$ ))<sub>Mann</sub>

Secondly, it should be noted that by treating epistemological modality as operating on (X) I assume that S's expression of his commitment with regard to the content of the predication restric-

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<sup>19</sup> -miş can also be used to express resultative aspect. In that case it immediately follows the stem, and may itself be followed by, for instance, the past tense suffix -ti, as in *Hasan gel-miş-ti* 'Hasan had come'. The importance of the position of -miş relative to other suffixes is reflected in sentences like *Hasan gel-miş*, in which -miş both directly follows the stem and is the most outer suffix. It is ambiguous between the two readings 'it seems that Hasan comes' and 'Hasan has come'.

ting (X) is part of the information he wishes to transmit. This is reflected in the possibility to report epistemologically modalized sentences:

- (80) He says that it is certainly possible that John won't be able to meet his sales target

Illocutionary adverbs cannot be reported in a similar way:

- (81) \*He says that frankly it is certainly possible that John won't be able to meet his sales target

The analysis of modal adverbs as elements modifying (X) and of illocutionary adverbs as elements modifying the clause as a whole, as exemplified in (79), accounts for this difference.

### 3. MOOD IN SPANISH

#### 3.0. Introduction

In this chapter the different uses of the Spanish indicative and subjunctive are studied. The first three sections are devoted to their use in main clauses and predications governed by a verbal or non-verbal predicate. In 3.1 I discuss the use of both moods as illocutionary force indicating devices, i.e. as elements through which S can code his communicative intention in his utterance. In 3.2 the use of mood in modalized contexts is gone into. A distinction is drawn between those contexts in which subjunctive or indicative are used obligatorily, and those in which both moods may appear. In the latter case mood inflection can be said to add to the meaning of a sentence, unless the application of both categories can be attributed to differences in the underlying structure of the sentences in which they appear. In 3.3 the remaining uses of indicative and subjunctive in predications governed by a verbal or non-verbal predicate are presented. In 3.4 some remarks are made on the use of mood inflection in relative clauses.

#### 3.1. Mood and illocutionary force

##### 3.1.1. *Speech act verbs*

The relation between illocutionary force and the use of mood in Spanish is illustrated in the following sentences, in which a predication is governed by a speech act verb:

- (82) Te aseguro que no es (I) culpa mía  
'I assure you that it's not my fault'
- (83) Te ordeno que lo hagas (S) cuanto antes  
'I order you to do it as soon as possible'
- (84) Pregunto si vienes (I) mañana  
'I ask whether you will come tomorrow'

The indicative is used in predications embedded under verbs of declaring and questioning, the subjunctive in predications embedded under verbs of ordering. If one compares these examples with their non-performative equivalents there is a partial parallelism with respect to the use of mood:

- (85) No es (I) culpa mía  
'It's not my fault'
- (86) ;Hazlo cuanto antes!  
'Do it as soon as possible!'
- (87) ¿Vienes (I) mañana?  
'Will you come tomorrow?'

The indicative is used in both embedded and non-embedded declarative<sup>14</sup> and interrogative sentences, as can be seen by comparing (82) and (84) with (85) and (87). With respect to imperative sentences the situation is less clear-cut. A special imperative inflection is used in (86). The use of this inflection type is restricted to second person familiar singular and plural affirmative in main clauses. Whenever the verb is embedded (83), negated (88) or in second person non-familiar the subjunctive is used:

- (88) ;No lo hagas(S)!  
'Don't do it'
- (89) ;Hagalo (S) Usted cuanto antes!  
'Do it (you-pol.) as soon as possible!'

I have no satisfactory explanation for the fact that the imperative and subjunctive mood are complementary in the way they are.<sup>15</sup> The examples show, however, that both the imperative and

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<sup>14</sup> Some examples of the limited use of the Subjunctive in main and embedded declarative sentences are presented in 3.2.2.3.

<sup>15</sup> A purely formal explanation for the difference between the use of the Imperative mood in affirmative main clauses and the Subjunctive mood in negative main clauses and embedded clauses in the second person familiar might be that the Imperative forms are bare forms of the predicate which do not allow the application of a predicate operator (Tense in embedded clauses, Negation in main clauses).



the subjunctive mood intervene in the expression of IMP in main clauses. This suggests that application of the approach, proposed by Dik (in prep.) and outlined in 2.1, in which sentences embedded under speech act verbs are provided with their own illocution is justified. I will adopt this approach in what follows. At the same time, given this approach, the differences in the expression of embedded and non-embedded imperatives show that sentence mood in Spanish cannot be regarded as part of the illocutionary frame, but should be handled by the final expression rules.

Different speech act verbs allow the embedding of more than one sentence type. Among these verbs are those which specify the manner in which a speech act is executed, such as *decir* 'say', *gritar* 'yell', *susurrar* 'murmur', *escribir* 'write', or the intensity with which this is done, such as *insistir* 'insist' and *sugerir* 'suggest'. The widest range of possibilities is exhibited by the verb *decir* 'say', which allows the embedding of declarative, interrogative and imperative sentences. The nine possibilities of single embedding are given in (90):

- (90)a Dice(I) que vienes (I) mañana (DECL(DECL))  
 b Dice(I) que si vienes(I) mañana (DECL(INT))  
 c Dice(I) que vengas (S) mañana (DECL(IMP))  
 d ¿Dice(I) que vienes(I) mañana? (INT(DECL))  
 e ¿Dice(I) que si vienes(I) mañana? (INT(INT))  
 f ¿Dice(I) que vengas (S) mañana? (INT(IMP))  
 Say (he/she) (come (you) (tomorrow))  
 g ¡Dile(Imp) que viene(I) mañana! (IMP(DECL))  
 h ¡Dile(Imp) que si viene mañana! (IMP(INT))  
 i ¡Dile(Imp) que venga(S) mañana! (IMP(IMP))  
 Say (you) (him/her) (come (he/she) (tomorrow))

What these examples show is that in embedded clauses there is a one to one relation between sentence type and mood inflection type, independent of the sentence type of the embedding clause. Guitart (1984), from whom the following examples are taken, notes that two groups of verbs show a behaviour similar to that of

speech act verbs: those designating mental acts and those designating acts of non-verbal signalling:

- (91) ;Piensa (Imp) que es (I) fácil! (IMP(DECL))  
 'Think that it is easy'  
 (92) ;Finge (Imp) que estás (I) contento! (IMP(DECL))  
 'Pretend that you're happy'

The similarity of behaviour of speech act verbs and mental act verbs fits in nicely with the view of thinking as 'talking to oneself' (see Dik 1986a). The similar pattern in (92) suggests that an illocutionary component is attributed to non-verbal means of communicating.

Although performative utterances are not very frequent in daily usage, Spanish speakers seem to express a certain *decir-consciousness* when adding the subordinator *que* to independent clauses, as in:

- (93) ;Que no me gusta (I) nada esa película!  
 'I don't like that movie at all!'  
 (94) ;Que no te marches (S) mañana!  
 'Don't you leave tomorrow!  
 (95) ;Que se siente (S) Usted!  
 'Sit down!'

In all these cases, the utterance is brought forward with more emphasis. A similar effect is produced by the addition of a performative verb (see Weijdema et al. 1982). A possible solution for the description of sentences like (93)-(95) is presented in 3.2.2.3.

## 3.1.2. Message denial

In this section I am concerned with constructions which a Spanish speaker may use to deny that a certain message is the one he wishes to transmit. Guitart (1984) classifies the following sentences as message denial constructions:

- (96) No es que seamos (S) de diferente estatura (que lo somos (I)); es que simplemente no tengo (I) ganas de bailar  
'It's not that we are of different heights (for we are); it's just that I don't feel like dancing'
- (97) No es que no tenga (S) dinero (pues sí tengo (I)); es que no tengo ganas de ir  
'It's not that I don't have money (for I do); it's that I don't feel like going'

As follows from the additions between brackets, for the use of the subjunctive in the first parts of these sentences it is irrelevant whether or not S considers the message to be true. So, for instance, the first part of (96) cannot be paraphrased by 'it is not the case that we are of different heights'. Yet I do not agree with Guitart's view that message denial is involved in these cases. The use of (96) would be appropriate in a context in which S has already made clear that he does not feel like going out to dance. In (96) he states, for instance as a reaction to a question of A, that the reason for this is not that he and A are of different heights, but that the reason is that he doesn't feel like dancing. *Que* is often used to replace *porque* 'because'. There is a close similarity between (96)-(97) and sentences like:

- (98) No va al teatro porque se aburra (S) (sino porque le gusta (I) el teatro)  
'He doesn't go to the theatre because he is bored (but because he likes theatre)'
- (99) No va al teatro, porque no le gusta el teatro  
'He doesn't go to the theatre, because he doesn't like theatre'

In (98) it is not denied that the subject goes to the theatre, it is denied that boredom is his reason for doing so. In (99) it is denied that the subject is going to the theatre and his reason for not doing so is given. Note that the reason in (99) may be presented in an independent sentence:

- (100) No va (I) al teatro. No le gusta (I) el teatro.  
'He doesn't go to the theatre. He doesn't like theatre.'

It is not possible to do the same with the two sentence parts in (98):

- (101) No va (I) al teatro. \*Se aburra (S).  
'He doesn't go to the theatre. He's bored.'

A possible solution to account for this difference is to provide satellites of reason of the type exemplified in (99) at least in some cases with their own declarative frame.<sup>16</sup> This solution is supported by the fact that modal adverbs expressing epistemological modality may be inserted in satellites of reason of this type, as in:

- (102) No va (I) al teatro, porque posiblemente le visitará su  
hermana  
'He doesn't go to the theatre, because maybe his sister  
will visit him'

Note that the use of *posiblemente* 'possibly' does not relate to the judgement of S, but to the judgment of the subject of the main clause. In this respect satellites of reason with an indicative are similar to reported speech acts. In Turkish this similarity is reflected in the fact that a participle of the verb *dimek*

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<sup>16</sup> Possibly a similar relationship holds between optative sentences and purpose expressions.

'say' is used as a complementizer for both reported direct speech and satellites of reason. Compare:<sup>17</sup>

- (103) Pervin, baş-ım agr-iyor diye yat-ti  
 Pervin, head-poss.p1 hurt-progr saying go.to.bed-past  
 'Pervin went to bed saying 'my head hurts''
- (104) Pervin, baş-ı agr-iyor diye yat-ti  
 Pervin, head-poss.p3 hurt-progr saying go.to.bed-past  
 'Pervin went to bed because her head hurt'

If in sentences like (102) a separate declarative frame is assigned to the satellite of reason, as represented in (105), both the fact that the indicative appears and the fact that the satellite is outside the scope of negation are accounted for:

- (105) DECL( $X_I$ : [Neg Ir<sub>V</sub> ( $x_i$ : p3 ( $x_i$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> ( $x_j$ : el teatro ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Dir</sub> ( $x_j$ : DECL( $X_J$ ): [Posiblemente ( $X_K$ : [Fut Visitar<sub>V</sub> ( $x_k$ : su hermana ( $x_k$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> ( $x_i$ ))<sub>Go</sub> | ( $X_K$ ) | ( $X_J$ )<sub>Reason</sub> | ( $X_I$ ))

The structure given here is not necessary for the *es que*-constructions given in (96)-(97). In those sentences the reason is not reported but presented. The underlying structure of the *es que*- and *no es que*-constructions may be represented as in:

- (106) DECL( $X_I$ :  $\begin{matrix} \text{Pos} \\ \text{Neg} \end{matrix}$  {( $X_J$ : [predication] ( $X_J$ ))<sub>Reason</sub>} ( $X_I$ ))

Copula support is triggered by the presence of the polarity operators on the predication-predicate.

It follows from this analysis that I do not classify sentences (96)-(97) as message denial constructions. I want to reserve that for sentences like (107a), which contrasts with (107b):

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<sup>17</sup> The following two examples are taken from Ersen-Rasch (1980).

- (107)a No digo que es (I) un idiota  
 b No digo que sea (S) un idiota  
 'I don't say that he's an idiot'

In (107a) S denies that he has expressed the opinion that someone is an idiot, which has been attributed to him or which he assumes to be attributed to him by another person. Lyons (1977) uses the term 'performative negation' for cases like this one. (107b) might be paraphrased as: 'I do not wish to classify him as an idiot'. To account for the difference between the two constructions I assume that two different verbs *decir* 'say' are involved here. Lyons (1977:740) distinguishes:

- (i)  $say_1$  : performing an illocutionary act  
 (ii)  $say_2$  : uttering, mouthing or pronouncing

Only  $say_1$  takes clauses as its complements. Accordingly, the underlying structures of (107a) and (107b) may be represented as:

- (108)a  $DECL(X_I: [Neg Decir_V (x_i: S (x_i))_{Ag} (X_J: DECL(X_J): [es un idiota] (X_J))_{Go}] (X_I))$   
 b  $DECL(X_I: [Neg Decir_V (x_i: S (x_i))_{Ag} (x_j: [sea un idiota] (x_j))_{Go}] (X_I))$

Only in the case of performative negation is the term 'message denial' appropriate. Note that the presence of the declarative frame accounts for the use of the indicative in (107a).

### 3.2. Mood and modality

#### 3.2.1. The use of mood in modal contexts

In most cases the occurrence of subjunctive or indicative follows automatically from the context in which the verb on which they are to be expressed appears. This also holds for modal contexts, i.e. contexts in which some modal distinction is expressed. All objectively modalized contexts require the application of either the indicative or the subjunctive and never allow both. Although

in all these cases the application of mood cannot be said to add to the meaning of the sentence, neither does it mean that the choice for one or the other category is purely at random. This is shown in the following overview of the use of mood in objectively modalized contexts. In the first column the different objective modal distinctions are given, in the second and third one the non verbal and verbal predicates through which these modal distinctions may be expressed, and in the fourth one the mood these predicates require to be marked on the verbal predicate in their complements:

## (109) MOOD AND OBJECTIVE MODALITY

| MODALITY    | LEXICAL EXPRESSION                         |                                 | MOOD |
|-------------|--|---------------------------------|------|
| Actual      | <i>Es el caso</i><br>'It's the case'       | <i>Ver</i><br>'See'             | Ind  |
| Certain     | <i>Es cierto</i><br>'It's certain'         | <i>Creer</i><br>'Believe'       | Ind  |
| Probable    | <i>Es probable</i><br>'It's probable'      | --                              | Subj |
| Possible    | <i>Es posible</i><br>'It's possible'       | --                              | Subj |
| Conceivable | <i>Es concebible</i><br>'It's conceivable' | --                              | Subj |
| Impossible  | <i>Es imposible</i><br>'It's impossible'   | --                              | Subj |
| Obligatory  | <i>Es obligatorio</i><br>'It's obligatory' | <i>Hace falta</i><br>'It needs' | Subj |
| Customary   | <i>Es conveniente</i><br>'It's suitable'   | <i>Conviene</i><br>'It suits'   | Subj |
| Permissible | <i>Es permisible</i><br>'It's permissible' | --                              | Subj |
| Acceptable  | <i>Es aceptable</i><br>'It's acceptable'   | --                              | Subj |
| Forbidden   | <i>Está prohibido</i><br>'It's forbidden'  | --                              | Subj |
| Doubtful    | <i>Es dudoso</i><br>'It's doubtful'        | <i>Dudar</i><br>'Doubt'         | Ind  |

The indicative is used:

- (i) In predications governed by a predicate through which it is expressed that the SoA designated by the embedded predication is evaluated as actual or certain.
- (ii) In predications governed by a predicate through which it is expressed that the SoA designated by the embedded predication is evaluated as doubtful.

In the case of the non-impersonal verbal predicates these evaluations are attributed to the subject of the matrix clause. An exception should be made for the first person present tense of *creer* 'believe', to which I return in 3.2.2.2. Furthermore, only *de re* belief and doubt are intended here.

If negated, the embedding predicates classified as expressing the modal distinctions 'actual' and 'certain' require the subjunctive in their complements. Negation does not affect the use of mood in all other cases.

I return to an explanation of the use of subjunctive and indicative in objective modal contexts in chapter four, where the two different uses of the indicative are argued to be related to their use in straightforward declarative and interrogative sentences respectively.

In some of the epistemologically modalized contexts both moods may appear. An overview of their uses is given in (110):



## (110) MOOD AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL MODALITY

| MODALITY     |             | LEXICAL EXPRESSION                  |  | MOOD      |
|--------------|-------------|-------------------------------------|--|-----------|
| Subjective   | -Epistemic  |                                     |  |           |
|              |             | Cert.                               | <i>Seguramente</i> --<br>'Certainly'                     | Ind(Subj) |
|              |             | Prob.                               | <i>Probablemente</i> <i>Creo</i><br>'Probably' 'I think' | Ind(Subj) |
|              |             | Poss.                               | <i>Quizás</i> --<br>'Maybe'                              | Ind(Subj) |
|              | -Volitional | <i>Ojalá</i><br>'Hopefully'         | <i>Espero</i><br>'I hope'                                | Subj      |
| Inferential  |             | <i>Evidentemente</i><br>'Evidently' | <i>Resulta</i><br>'It appears'                           | Ind       |
| Quotative    |             | --                                  | <i>Parece</i><br>'It seems'                              | Ind       |
| Experiential |             | <i>Aparentemente</i>                | --   | Ind       |

In 3.2.2.3. I offer an explanation for the fact that in contexts in which elements expressing subjective epistemic modality appear both indicative and subjunctive may be used. But first I present some other contexts allowing mood alternation.

## 3.2.2. Mood alternation

There are some contexts in which the indicative and subjunctive can be contrasted. In two of these contexts, differences in the underlying structure of the contrasting sentences account for the use of both moods. Conditioning factors are the difference between *de re* and *de dicto* interpretations (3.2.2.1.) and the absence or presence of truth commitment on the part of S, combining with the former context (3.2.2.2.). The third context is described in terms of the interaction between illocutionary force and modality (3.2.2.3.).

3.2.2.1. *De dicto/de re* alternation

A sentence like

(111) Creo que Juan está (I) enfermo  
 'I believe that Juan is ill'

has two readings (see Burge 1977):

- (i) I believe the proposition 'Juan is ill'
- (ii) I have the impression that Juan is ill

The first one is the *de dicto*, the second one the *de re* reading of (111). The difference is not visible in a positive context. Under negation, however, there is no ambiguity. Compare:

(112)a No creo que Juan está (I) enfermo  
 b No creo que Juan esté (S) enfermo  
 'I don't believe that Juan is ill'

In the *de dicto* variant (112a) the indicative is maintained. in the *de re* variant (112b) the subjunctive appears, in line with the rules given for objective modality in 3.2.1. In 2.3 the difference between content phrases and predications in their SoA-designating function has been formalized as a difference between (X) and (x). Application of this formalization to (112a) and (112b) yields:

(113)a DECL( $X_J$ : [PresNeg Creer<sub>V</sub> ( $x_i$ : S ( $x_i$ ))<sub>ϕExp</sub> ( $X_I$ : [Juan está enfermo] ( $X_I$ ))<sub>Go</sub>] ( $X_J$ ))  
 b DECL( $X_I$ : [PresNeg Creer<sub>V</sub> ( $x_i$ : S ( $x_i$ ))<sub>ϕExp</sub> ( $x_j$ : [Juan esté enfermo] ( $x_j$ ))<sub>Go</sub>] ( $X_I$ ))

What is represented in (113a) is that S rejects a proposition ( $X_I$ ) which has been brought forward by one of the participants in the preceding conversation. The representation in (113b) is intended to reflect S's statement that he does not have the impression that the SoA ( $x_j$ ) obtains in reality.

The presence of the (X) boundary in (113a) blocks the influence of the negative element in the matrix clause, i.e. it limits the

scope of negation. A similar effect was illustrated in 2.3 in with respect to negative raising, and in 3.1.2 with respect to message denial. The scope differences between (113a) and (113b) may again be illustrated, as in 2.3, by testing the behaviour of sentences in which the embedded predication contains an adverbial expression which requires a negative context, in this case *palabra de* 'word of':

- (114)a \*No creo que sabe (I) palabra del asunto  
 b No creo que sepa (S) palabra del asunto  
 'I don't believe he knows a thing about that matter'

The ungrammaticality of (114a) corresponds with the ungrammaticality of independent clauses like:

- (115) \*Sabe palabra del asunto  
 'He knows a thing about that matter'

#### 3.2.2.2. Truth commitment

In the preceding section I have restricted myself to *de dicto/de re* alternation in sentences in which the matrix verb is marked for present tense and first person singular, i.e. those cases in which subject and speaker are one and the same person. According to different authors (Lléo 1979, Klein 1974, 1977) a somewhat different interpretation should be given to the following sentences, in which the subject is non first person:

- (116) Antonio no cree (I) que Juan está (I) enfermo  
 'Antonio does not believe that Juan is ill'  
 (117) Antonio duda que Juan está (I) enfermo<sup>10</sup>  
 'Antonio doubts that Juan is ill'

These sentences have the following interpretation:

- (i) Antonio does not believe/doubts that Juan is ill

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<sup>10</sup> In some Spanish dialects this example is judged to be ungrammatical.

(ii) S does believe that Juan is ill

The difference between these sentences and those presented in the preceding section is shown in the ungrammaticality of the following sentence:

(118) \*Dudo que Juan está (I) enfermo  
'I doubt that Juan is ill'

Sentences like (118) with a matrix verb with incorporated negation cannot be used to reject a content phrase, unlike the combination *no + creer*.<sup>19</sup> Therefore (118) contains a contradiction:

(i) S doubts that Juan is ill  
(ii) S believes that Juan is ill

A content phrase with respect to which S expresses his commitment would receive the following structure in the approach presented in 2.3:

(119) (CertX<sub>1</sub>: [predication] (X<sub>1</sub>))

Embedding of this structure in the matrix clause of (116) yields the following representation:

(120) DECL(X<sub>J</sub>: [PresNeg Creer<sub>V</sub> (x<sub>i</sub>: Antonio (x<sub>i</sub>))<sub>φExp</sub> (CertX<sub>I</sub>:  
[Juan está enfermo] (X<sub>I</sub>))<sub>Go</sub>] (X<sub>J</sub>))

Confirmation for the analysis of the embedded predication as a subjectively modalized content phrase may be derived from the fact that S can contrast his judgement with the opinion of the subject of the matrix clause in positive terms only. The ungrammaticality of (121) corresponds with the non existence of the modal adverb *inseguramente* 'uncertainly':

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<sup>19</sup> I therefore disagree with Klein (1977), who proposes to classify *dudar* 'doubt' and *no + creer* as two members of one group of predicates.

- (121) \*Antonio cree que Juan esté (S) enfermo  
'Antonio believes that Juan is ill'

The (not semantically anomalous) interpretation of this sentence would be:

- (i) Antonio believes that Juan is ill  
(ii) S does not believe that Juan is ill

Two groups of verbs behave in a way similar to that of believe predicates: verbs of the category say 2 (see 3.1.2.) and cognitive predicates. With regard to the first category, compare the following sentences, taken from Guitart (1984):

- (121)a La carta no dice que la culpa es (I) mía  
b La carta no dice que la culpa sea (S) mía  
'The letter doesn't say that I'm to blame'

According to Guitart, S's usual intention in uttering (121a) is to express '... that the letter has failed to include the fact that he is indeed to blame', while in uttering (121b) his usual intention is '... to point out that this is not what the letter says (...) while at the same time not admitting that he is to blame ...'.

With regard to cognitive predicates, consider:

- (122)a Antonio no sabe que Juan está (I) enfermo  
b?Antonio no sabe que Juan esté (S) enfermo  
'Antonio doesn't know that Juan is ill'

Sentence (122b) is highly marked. The semi-factive character of *saber* 'know' requires a positive judgment of S with regard to the content of the embedded predication. If S is not able to express his positive commitment it would be more appropriate to use:

- (123) Antonio no sabe si Juan está (I) enfermo  
'Antonio doesn't know whether Juan is ill'

Sentence (122b) may only be used as a free indirect speech report of:

- (124) No sé que Juan esté (S) enfermo  
'I don't know that Juan would be ill'

in which S expresses his reservation with respect to a statement of another person. One might say that, apart from this use, verbs like *saber* 'know' cannot be used if S cannot commit himself to the truth of the content of the embedded predication, as illustrated by the ungrammaticality of (125):

- (125) \*No sé que Juan está (I) enfermo  
'I don't know that Juan is ill'

This sentence contains a contradiction, contrary to (126) (see 3.2.2.1.):

- (126) No creo que Juan está (I) enfermo  
'I don't believe that Juan is ill'

Therefore, to account for the semi-factive character of cognitive predicates I assume that these predicates allow the embedding of (CertX)-complements only. It is in this sense that speaker presupposition distinguishes itself from logical presupposition (see 3.3.2.). This approach to cognitive predicates furthermore supports the idea expressed in 2.3 that (X) might be the basic unit of knowledge.

Special attention should be given to the use of cognitive predicates in what Guitart (1984: 161) calls 'admission of cognitive failure'. An example is:

- (127) No sabía que mi artículo tenía (I) errores  
'I didn't know there were mistakes in my article'

Through the use of the indicative in (127) S indicates that he does know now what he did not know at an earlier moment. Just as S may contrast his knowledge with that of a third person, he may contrast his actual knowledge with his knowledge in an earlier stage. If K stands for knowledge, S for speaker, X for third person,  $t_s$  for the moment of speaking and  $t_r$  for the moment referred to, the following two formulas hold for (122a) and (127) respectively:

$$(128) \quad K_{S_{t_s}} \neq K_{X_{t_s}} \quad (122a)$$

$$K_{S_{t_s}} \neq K_{S_{t_r}} \quad (t_r < t_s) \quad (127)$$

In both cases the embedded predication represents  $K_{S_{t_s}}$ .

### 3.2.2.3. Mitigation and reinforcement

The last case of contrasting use of mood in modalized contexts concerns the possibility of using both the indicative and the subjunctive in subjectively modalized contexts, as was indicated in the overview of the use of mood in epistemologically modalized contexts in (110). Some examples are:

(129) Quizás vienen/vengan (I/S) mañana  
'Maybe they will come tomorrow'

(130) Sospecho que vienen/vengan (I/S) mañana  
'I assume that they will come tomorrow'

The use of the subjunctive in sentences like (129)-(130) corresponds to a higher degree of reservation of S with regard to the truth of the content of the predication (see Hooper 1974:30, Bergen 1978). The effect is comparable to the one produced by the use of the past tense forms of the English modals expressing subjective epistemic modality, as in:

(131) He may/might be on his way by now

One might simply assume that the difference between the sentences of each pair should be accounted for in terms of different degrees of commitment in a subjective modal sense. However, I would like to consider a different solution, which is mainly based on the fact that a small group of Spanish modal verbs may appear in both the indicative and the past subjunctive. Note that in (129)-(130) the verb inflected for indicative and subjunctive appears in a context which has already been modalized subjectively, while the modal verbs in the main clauses of the following sentences receive this inflection without other modalizing elements being present:<sup>20</sup>

- (132) Usted debe/debiera (I/PastS) enseñarle su biblioteca  
'You must/should show him your library'
- (133) Quiero/Quisiera (I/PastS) que Usted le enseñe/enseñase  
(PresS/PastS) su biblioteca  
'I want/would like you to show him your library'
- (134) ¿Puede/Pudiera (I/PastS) enseñarle su biblioteca?  
'Can/could you show him your library?'

Apart from its use as an indicator of illocutionary force, these are the only possible uses of the subjunctive in independent clauses.

To account for the difference in meaning of the sentence pairs (129)-(134) I once more return to speech act theory. It should be noted that some of the modal distinctions discussed in 2.2 are at the same time central notions in speech act theory. Some of Searle's (1969) felicity conditions for the execution of a speech act, the addressee-based preparatory conditions and the speaker-based sincerity conditions, are given in (135):<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> An explanation for the use of the past subjunctive in these cases might be that the use of the present subjunctive would cause ambiguity as it is also used for imperatives. In subjectively modalized contexts this ambiguity cannot arise, as only declaratives can be subjectively modalized.

<sup>21</sup> See Haverkate (1979).



## (135) S-BASED AND A-BASED FELICITY CONDITIONS

| Speech act | S-based cond. | A-based cond.     |
|------------|---------------|-------------------|
| Assertion  | S believes p  | A doesn't know p  |
| Command    | S wants p     | A is able to do p |

It cannot be a coincidence that in the formulation of the S-based conditions the two basic notions of subjective modality are used. On the contrary, one would expect, given the analysis of the clause as representing the different levels of the speech act, that the S-based conditions, formulated in terms of speaker commitment, are incorporated in the structure of the clause, as in:

(136) DECL(Believe<sub>S</sub> X<sub>1</sub>: [predication] (X<sub>1</sub>))

(137) IMP(Want<sub>S</sub> X<sub>1</sub>: [predication] (X<sub>1</sub>))

These might be suitable representations for the logical structure of different types of speech acts, but not for the general structure of linguistic expressions. For one thing, the S-based sincerity conditions are often just presupposed and not expressed. For another, (137) is incorrect. What S does when making explicit the sincerity condition of a command is precisely avoiding issuing an imperative by replacing it by a statement. Therefore, for those cases in which S gives expression to the sincerity condition of a command, the following structure should replace (137):

(138) DECL(Want<sub>S</sub> X<sub>1</sub>: [predication] (X<sub>1</sub>))

In analyses of indirect speech acts (Searle 1975, Haverkate 1979) different strategies to decrease the directness of a speech act have been distinguished. One of these strategies is for S to give expression to the S-based condition, as in (133). As has been noted above, the S-based conditions of commands and assertions coincide with two of the subjective modal distinctions made.

Another strategy is for S to question the A-based condition, as in (134). The A-based ability condition of commands coincides with one of the inherent modal distinctions made.<sup>22</sup> The use of sentences like (132) represents a third strategy: instead of creating an obligation by issuing an order S states that an obligation exists. In the latter case A can question the source of this obligation, a feature of objective modality (see 2.2.2).

What may be derived from these coincidences between certain modal distinctions and central notions of speech act theory is that one of the functions of modalizing an utterance is to arrive at a lesser degree of directness of the speech act involved. Note that, with regard to the modal distinctions discussed here,


- (i) the modal verbs which may be used to give expression to the S-based sincerity conditions have been analyzed earlier as elements which take a content phrase in their scope;
- (ii) the modal verbs which may be used to give expression to the A-based preparatory condition have been analyzed earlier as SoA-internal;
- (iii) the modal verbs which may be used to arrive at a lesser degree of directness without mentioning either of these conditions have been analyzed as occupying an intermediate position, taking the SoA in their scope.

An interesting hypothesis would be that these verbs represent a scale of decreasing directness the deeper they are embedded, corresponding to the different positions assigned to the three different types of modality discussed in 2.2, as in:

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<sup>22</sup> The absence of a relationship between the A-based condition of an assertion and some inherent modal distinction coincides with the impossibility to question this A-based condition without at the same time making an assertion, as in *Do you know it's five o'clock?* A paradox which may be solved partly by informing after A's state of knowledge before the moment of speaking, as in *Did you know it's five o'clock?*

## (139) DEGREES OF DIRECTNESS



The following series seems to support this hypothesis:

(140)a ;Enseñele su biblioteca!

'Show him your library!'

b Quiero que Usted le enseñe su biblioteca

'I want you to show him your library'

c Usted debe enseñarle su biblioteca


'You must show him your library'

d ¿Puede Usted enseñarle su biblioteca?

'Can you show him your library'

If correct, the hypothesis may at the same time provide a partial explanation for the diachronic development of modal verbs, which tend to be reinterpreted along the following line (see Goossens 1985a-b, Foley & Van Valin 1984):

## (141) DIACHRONIC DEVELOPMENT OF MODAL VERBS



If one of the functions of modalizing an utterance is to decrease the degree of directness, the reinterpretation of modality might be related to the wearing off of politeness expressions and the conventionalizing of indirectness strategies.

Returning now to the use of mood in the modalized sentences presented at the beginning of this section, I interpret the use of the (past) subjunctive as the application of a grammatical means through which S further mitigates the force of his speech act, and not as a device to indicate a lesser degree of commitment

with regard to the content of a predication. This view implies that this use of mood should be explained in terms of the rules that govern verbal interaction and the ways in which these rules are reflected in linguistic structure. By using the subjunctive in (129)-(130) or by using the past tense form of the modal *may* in (131), S leaves more room for A to disagree with him or for himself to withdraw from a position taken. By using the subjunctive in (132)-(134) S exposes a higher degree of politeness and leaves more room for refusal. I will use the term 'mitigation'<sup>23</sup> as a label for these different communicative strategies. Mitigating expressions, whether lexical or grammatical, should take the whole clause as representing the speech act in their scope. The underlying structure of the mitigated variants of (129)-(134) may therefore be represented as:

(142) Mit.ILL<sub>E</sub>(X<sub>1</sub>: [predication] (X<sub>1</sub>))

That mitigation takes the whole clause in its scope is reflected in Spanish in the fact that mitigation affects all inflected forms of the predication, as in (143b):

(143)a Quizás es (I) seguro que la ceguera puede (I) ser vencida  
 b Quizás sea (S) seguro que la ceguera pueda (S) ser vencida  
 'It may/might be possible that blindness can be cured'

(144)a Quiero (I) que Usted le enseñe (PresS) su biblioteca  
 b Quisiera (PastS) que Usted le enseñase (PastS) su biblioteca  
 'I want/would like you to show him your library'

Mitigation favours modalized predications. However, not all modal distinctions are equally compatible with it. Mitigating a statement while at the same time expressing strong commitment with respect to its content in a subjective modal sense is not a likely combination, although it does occur, as can be seen in the following example, cited by Bolinger (1976:47):

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<sup>23</sup> The terms 'mitigation' and 'reinforcement' are taken from Haverkate (1979), in which a discussion of a number of mitigating and reinforcing devices in Spanish may be found.

- (145) Segurísima estoy de que por culpa mía se mude (S) el tiempo  
 'I'm more than certain that it's my fault that times change'

Some parenthetical verbs may be classified as lexical mitigating expressions:

- (146) Juan viene (I) mañana, creo/temo  
 'Juan will come tomorrow, I think/I'm afraid'

The counterpart of mitigation is reinforcement. Just as S may wish to express a higher degree of reservation, he may wish to impose his speech act more strongly upon A or, as it were, put an exclamation mark behind his utterance. One of the ways in which this is done in Spanish has been illustrated in 3.1.1. The addition of the subordinator *que* to a clause has a reinforcing effect, as in:

- (147) ¡Que no me gusta nada esa película!  
 'I don't like that movie at all!'

The scope of the reinforcing expression *que* is reflected in its initial position in the utterance. In Turkish, a V-final language, the reinforcing affix *-dir* takes the final position in the utterance:<sup>24</sup>

- (148) Bu, Türkçe gazete değil-dir  
 This Turkish newspaper not-reinf  
 'This is not a Turkish newspaper at all!'

The underlying structure of sentences like (167)-(168) may be represented as:

- (149) Reinf.ILL<sub>E</sub>(X<sub>1</sub>: [predication] (X<sub>1</sub>))

---

<sup>24</sup> This is only one of the uses of *-dir*. See Lewis (1967).

Reinforcement may be expected to favour non-modalized predications and predications containing a compatible modal distinction, such as subjective strong commitment.

The performative use of speech act verbs may be analyzed as a lexical reinforcing device. Until now, I have used the same representation for all sentences in which a speech act verb is applied, performatively or non-performatively (reporting): both the main and embedded clause were provided with an illocutionary frame, as in:

- (150)a DECL( $X_I$ : [I say ( $X_J$ : DECL( $X_J$ : [you are a fool]( $X_J$ ))] ( $X_I$ ))  
 b DECL( $X_I$ : [He says ( $X_J$ : DECL( $X_J$ : [you are a fool]( $X_J$ ))] ( $X_I$ ))

To account for the fact that the performative use of speech act verbs has a reinforcing effect, whereas the non-performative use has not, a distinction should be made between these two uses, as in:

- (151)a I say ( $X_I$ : DECL( $X_I$ : [you are a fool]( $X_I$ ))  
 b DECL( $X_I$ : [He says ( $X_J$ : DECL( $X_J$ : [you are a fool]( $X_J$ ))] ( $X_I$ ))

These representations are intended to account for the fact that in its performative use the speech act verb is added to the message, whereas in its non-performative use it is part of the message. This view implies a close relationship between parenthetical verbs and the performative use of speech act verbs (see Lyons 1977:ch.16). From this approach further confirmation can be derived for the view that sentence mood should not be regarded as part of the illocutionary frame but should be handled by the final expression rules: mitigated declaratives require subjunctive inflection, non-qualified and reinforced declaratives require indicative inflection.

In chapter 2 illocutionary force and modality were analyzed as pertaining to different layers of the clause. Mood in Spanish has

been discussed with respect to each of these layers earlier in this chapter. In this section some cases have been presented in which illocutionary force and modality seem to coincide. I hope to have shown that, rather than making the distinction drawn invalid, it is by virtue of this distinction that these cases can be handled in terms of the interaction between the different layers of the clause.

### 3.3. Remaining uses of mood in embedded predications

Two groups of predicates which can take a predication as one of their arguments and do not give expression to a modal distinction have not yet been discussed: verbs of causation, and predicates of subjective feeling. Verbs of causation, whether negated or not, always require the subjunctive in their finite complements, which might indicate that the subjunctive is the unmarked mood in this grammatical context. Predicates of subjective feeling allow both moods in their complements, as illustrated in (152):

- (152) Me molesta que Juan no está/esté (I/S) aquí  
'It bothers me that Juan isn't here'

Guitart (1982) shows that the indicative is used if S judges the information contained in the embedded predication to be new to A. This is reflected in the fact that the indicative is always used in focus constructions:

- (153) Lo que es curioso es que Juan no lo sabe (I)  
'What is strange is that Juan doesn't know it'

The non-clefted variant allows both moods:

- (154) Es curioso que Juan no lo sabe/sepa (I/S)  
'It's strange that Juan doesn't know it'

although the subjunctive is used most frequently. This is not surprising, as predicates of subjective feeling are factive and therefore have complements which are 'implied by the Speaker to

be true' and designate 'identifiable SoA's' (Bolkestein 1981). Focus assignment to the complement as a whole is nevertheless possible, and it is this focus assignment which triggers the use of the indicative. Confirmation for this view can be derived from the changes Guitart (1982) observes in the use of the indicative in this context among Spanish-speaking immigrants in the USA. S may judge the information contained in the complement to be new to A in terms of:

- (i) A's knowledge of the preceding conversation
- (ii) A's knowledge of the speech situation
- (iii) A's general knowledge

Guitart notes a decreasing use of the indicative as a result of interference, which may be described as a change from (i) to (iii). Whereas speakers of Spanish who have not been subject to interference judge the newness of information in terms of (i)-(ii), Spanish-English bilinguals judge the newness of information in terms of (iii), and use the indicative only if the information contained in the complement is judged to be unexpected by A.

A certain grammaticalization of the Topic/Focus distinction seems to be responsible for the fact that *el hecho de que* 'the fact that' sentences in pre-matrix position take the subjunctive only, whereas in post-matrix position they allow both moods (see Guitart 1984, Terrell & Hooper 1974).

Before going into the formalization of factivity and the use of mood in factive complements I would like to return to the distinction that has been drawn earlier between the content-representing and SoA-designating function of predications. Given this distinction and its formalization, the following representations may be given to terms designating first, second and third order entities:



## (155) FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ORDER ENTITIES

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| First order  | $(x_i: \text{Pred}_N(x_i))_{sf}$             |
| Second order | $(x_i: [\text{predication}](x_i))_{sf}^{25}$ |
| Third order  | $(X_I: [\text{predication}](X_I))_{sf}$      |

These representations account for the possibility of referring to objects, SoA's and content phrases respectively. In the latter two cases predications may be used, although their status in these two uses is different. The way in which this difference is reflected in Spanish has been discussed in 3.2.2.1. A further distinction should be drawn now to distinguish between the factive and non-factive uses of predications in their SoA-designating function.

In 2.2.2 it was argued that S may evaluate a SoA with respect to its actuality. One might say now that once S reaches the conclusion to which the objective modal distinction 'certain' has been applied, he stores the information that the predication under consideration refers to a particular situation obtaining in reality or in a hypothesized situation as part of his knowledge, as in:

(156)  $(X_I: (dx_i: [\text{predication}](x_i))(X_I))$

Dik (1986a) uses representations similar to the one given in (156) as units of 'referential knowledge', but restricts himself to first order entities.

Returning now to the difference between factive and non-factive complements, I assume that a factive complement refers to one of the entities available to S on the basis of his referential knowledge, whereas a non-factive complement refers to a possible SoA

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<sup>25</sup> A separate SoA-variable could be used here, such as the sentence variable (e) proposed by Vet (1986). In terms of the clause analysis presented in 2.3 this variable would represent the narrated event.

which is under evaluation. The difference between non-factive, factive, and semi-factive (see 3.2.2.2) complements can be represented as follows:

## (157) NON-FACTIVE, FACTIVE AND SEMI-FACTIVE COMPLEMENTS

|              |  |
|--------------|--|
| Non-factive  | $(x_i: [\text{predication}] (x_i))_{sf}$             |
| Factive      | $(dlx_i: [\text{predication}] (x_i))_{sf}$           |
| Semi-factive | $(\text{cert.}X_I: [\text{predication}] (X_I))_{sf}$ |

Bolkestein (1981) proposes that factive complements be provided with a term operator 'f', but mentions the possibility of using the definiteness operator as an alternative. It follows from (157) that I prefer the latter analysis. Confirmation for this view may be derived from the fact that verbal nouns, if used to replace a finite factive complement, are necessarily definite, as the nominalized equivalent of (152) shows:

- (158) Me molesta la ausencia de Juan  
'The absence of Juan bothers me'

The definiteness of factive complements is furthermore reflected in the fact that they may be preceded by the determiner *el* 'the', as in:

- (159) Me molesta el que Juan no está/esté (I/S) aquí  
'It bothers me (the) that Juan isn't here'

The conditions for the use of the subjunctive and indicative in factive complements can now be represented as follows:

## (160) INDICATIVE AND SUBJUNCTIVE IN FACTIVE COMPLEMENTS

|   |        |      |
|---|--------|------|
| $(dlx_i: [\text{predication}] (x_i))_{sfTop}$ | —————> | Subj |
| $(dlx_i: [\text{predication}] (x_i))_{sfFoc}$ | —————> | Ind  |

### 3.4. Mood alternation in relative clauses

To illustrate a possible extension of the analysis of illocution and modality presented in this paper, I will look in this section at the alternating use of mood in a different grammatical context. In restrictive relative clauses, to which I will restrict myself here, both the indicative and the subjunctive may be used. The indicative can be used if the antecedent is specific. The subjunctive *must* be used if the antecedent is non-specific. If the referent of a term is known to S and judged to be unknown to A a term is used specifically. If the referent of a term is unknown to S and judged to be unknown to A a term is used non-specifically (see Hawkins 1978). Some verbs, such as *comprar* 'buy', require a specific goal argument in the past and present tense:

- (161) Compré una casa que tiene (I) diez habitaciones  
'I bought a house which has ten rooms'

whereas the same restriction does not hold in the future tense:

- (162) Compraré una casa que tenga (S) diez cuartos  
'I will buy a house which has ten rooms'

Other verbs, such as *conocer* 'know (someone)', always require a specific argument except if negated:

- (163) Conozco a<sup>26</sup> alguien que sabe (I) holandés  
'I know someone who speaks Dutch'  
No conozco nadie que sepa (S) holandés  
'I don't know anyone who speaks Dutch'

In what follows I concentrate on restrictive relative clauses with a specific antecedent, in which both the indicative and the subjunctive may appear. First consider the following examples, (see Manteca Alonso 1981):

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<sup>26</sup> Human and personified specific goals receive case marking (a).

- (165)a Busco a una secretaria que sabe (I) inglés (sp.)  
b Busco una secretaria que sepa (S) inglés (n-sp.)  
(166)a Una secretaria que sabe (I) inglés busca trabajo (sp.)  
b\*Una secretaria que sepa (S) inglés busca trabajo (n-sp.)

In general, only specific terms can be the point of departure for a statement, although there are several exceptions to this rule, such as generic statements. This 'point of departure' may be labelled 'subject', given the following examples:

- (167)a Una secretaria que sabe (I) inglés fué buscada por Antonio  
b\*Una secretaria que sepa (S) inglés fué buscada por Antonio

Consequently, in the following context una secretaria 'a secretary' can only be interpreted specifically:

- (168) Busco a una secretaria. Trabaja (I) en este edificio  
'I'm looking for a secretary. She works in this building'

The same holds for the following contexts, in which the second utterance is modalized epistemologically:

- (169) Busco a una secretaria. Creo que trabaja en este edificio.  
'I'm looking for a secretary. I think she works in this building'

- (170) Busco a una secretaria. Parece que trabaja (I) en este edificio  
'I'm looking for a secretary. It seems that she works in this building'

Returning to restrictive relative clauses, it is interesting to note that whenever the antecedent is specific, the relative clause can be modalized epistemologically, as in:

- (171) Ayer ví a un chico que posiblemente es/sea (I/S) un amigo tuyo  
'Yesterday I saw a boy who may/might be a friend of yours'

- (172) Ayer ví a un chico que creo que es/sea (I/S) un amigo tuyo  
'Yesterday I saw a boy who I think is a friend of yours'

A possible explanation for this fact might be that S, instead of making two separate assertions, as in (168)-(170), attaches the second one as a restrictor to the term variable of a specific term. The assertive character of relative clauses restricting specific antecedents and their counterparts in English is noted in Bolinger (1974). He uses the following examples:

- (173) I bought a house which, I assure you, has ten rooms  
(174) \*I need a house which, I assure you, has ten rooms

To account for the difference between relative clauses in specific and non-specific terms, the representation of specificity should be discussed first. Brown (1985) proposes that specific terms be provided with a 'cert(ain)' and non-specific terms with an 'uncert(ain)' term operator. I follow him in the use of 'cert', but replace 'uncert' by 'poss(ible)'. The reason for this replacement is that these term operators are subject to a restriction which is similar to a restriction on predication operators: they cannot be expressed in negative terms. Compare for instance the following sentences:

- (175)a I'm looking for a certain secretary  
b\*I'm looking for an uncertain secretary  
(176)a I'm trying to find a possible solution  
b\*I'm trying to find an impossible restriction

This restriction coincides with the non-existence of modal adverbs like *uncertainly* and *impossibly*, indicating a certain similarity between specificity and epistemological certainty which may be defined in the following way:

- (i) (cert  $x_1$ ) S expresses his certainty about the existence of the entity he refers to.  
(ii) (cert  $x_1$ ) S expresses his certainty about the truth

of the predication he puts forward for consideration.

In both cases the impossibility to express a negative judgment seems to be conditioned by the incompatibility of a negative judgment and the act of asserting or predicating.

The assertive character of relative clauses restricting specific antecedents can be accounted for by providing them with their own declarative frame, as in the following representation of the underlying structure of (171):

(177) DECL( $X_I$ : [Past Ver<sub>V</sub> ( $x_i$ : S ( $x_i$ ))<sub>φEXP</sub> (cert $x_j$ : un chico ( $x_j$ ): DECL( $X_J$ : Posiblemente ( $X_J$ ): [Pres{( $x_k$ : amigo ( $x_k$ ): {( $x_l$ : A ( $x_l$ ))<sub>POSS</sub> } ( $x_k$ ))} (Rx<sub>j</sub>)<sub>φ</sub>] ( $X_J$ ))]<sub>Go</sub>] ( $X_I$ ))

whereas the following underlying structure can be assigned to (165b), in which the relative clause restricts a non-specific term variable:

(178) DECL( $X_I$ : [Pres Buscar<sub>V</sub> ( $x_i$ : S ( $x_i$ ))<sub>Ag</sub> (possx<sub>j</sub>: una secretaria ( $x_j$ ): Pres Saber<sub>V</sub> (Rx<sub>j</sub>))<sub>φEXP</sub> ( $x_k$ : inglés ( $x_k$ ))<sub>Go</sub>]<sub>Go</sub>] ( $X_I$ ))

The underlying structure assigned to relative clauses restricting a specific term variable exemplified in (178) makes it possible to explain the use of the subjunctive in this type of relative clause. An example of this use was given in (171), where it is the result of mitigation of the embedded declarative. Rivero (1979) provides another example:

(179) El que asesinara (PastS) a Smith está loco  
'The man who would have/might have killed Smith is crazy'

The interpretation of the use of the subjunctive in relative clauses of this type is somewhat difficult. On one interpreta-

tion, the subjunctive is used to express quotative modality, on another it expresses mitigation. For the time being, I prefer the latter analysis, as this use of the (past) subjunctive might be related to the ambiguity which arises with regard to the question which speaker is responsible for the embedded declarative in sentences like:

- (180) Antonio vió a un chico que quizás es/sea (I/S) un amigo  
tuyo  
'Antonio saw a boy who may/might be a friend of yours'

The embedded declarative may be attributed to either Antonio or the person uttering (180). The need to disambiguate between these two readings arises only in those cases in which S has his reservations with respect to the truth of the information contained in the embedded declarative. This impression correlates with the fact that at least some speakers of Spanish judge the use of the indicative in subjectively modalized reported declaratives to be ungrammatical, as in:

- (181) Dice que posiblemente \*viene/venga (I/S) mañana  
'He says that maybe he will come tomorrow'

#### 4. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In the preceding chapter the different uses of mood in Spanish have been treated, following the general observations made in chapter 2 with regard to the different levels to be distinguished within the structure of the clause. The question remains to be answered now whether these uses are somehow related. In order to do so, I first go into the relation between two of the different uses of mood: in objectively modalized predications, and in predications governed by an illocutionary frame.

Recall that two types of frames were distinguished in 2.3: illocutionary frames and predicate frames. Both may govern predications: in the case of illocutionary frames these predications restrict (X) and represent the content of an utterance. In the case of the objective modal predicate frames these predications restrict (x) and designate SoA's. A comparison of the use of mood in predications governed by these two types of frames reveals some interesting correlations. In (182) an overview is given of the use of indicative and subjunctive in predications governed by an illocutionary frame, including reinforced and mitigated declaratives, and in non-factive predications governed by a predicate expressing some objective modal distinction. The use of mood, given in the right hand column, holds for both predications in (X) governed by the corresponding illocutionary frame in the left hand column and predications in (x) governed by a predicate of the type indicated in the second column:



(182) MOOD IN PREDICATIONS IN ( $X_1$ ) AND ( $x_1$ )

| (Qualified)<br>Illocutionary<br>frame | Predicate<br>frame<br>expresses | Mood<br>in embedded<br>predication |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------------|
|                                       | Epistemic<br>modality           |                                    |
| DECL( $X_1$ ) (Neutral)               | Actual (Neutral)                | Ind                                |
| DECL( $X_1$ ) (Reinforced)            | Certain                         | Ind                                |
| DECL( $X_1$ ) (Mitigated)             | Less than certain               | Subj                               |
| IMP( $X_1$ )                          | Deontic<br>modality             | Subj                               |
| INT( $X_1$ )                          | Doubt                           | Ind                                |

The correspondence between certain basic illocutions and categories of objective modality with respect to the use of mood seems to have the same explanation in all the different cases presented in (182): There is a connection between S's:

- (i) presenting part of his knowledge in a declarative sentence/stating that something is consistent with his knowledge, with various subdistinctions at both levels;
- (ii) creating an obligation in an imperative sentence (or granting permission, which has not been discussed)/stating that according to his knowledge some obligation exists;
- (iii) asking A for information in an interrogative sentence/stating that he is unable to evaluate a predication in terms of his knowledge.

Note with regard to the notion of doubt that only *de re* doubt ('doubt if') as opposed to *de dicto* doubt ('doubt that') is intended here.

The correspondence between the uses of mood related to illocutionary force and objective modality should not lead to the con-

clusion that one single principle underlies these different uses. Such an approach would not be able to account for the fact that the rules for the application of mood in objective modal contexts may be violated in the context of mitigation:

- (183) Quizás es (I) seguro que viene (I) mañana (Neutral)  
 Quizás sea (S) seguro que venga (S) mañana (Mitigated)  
 'It may/might be certain that he will come tomorrow'

Of all the different uses of mood presented in (182) there is only one in which mood can be said to fulfil a distinguishing function: qualification of a declarative sentence is expressed through the use of indicative or subjunctive. In all other cases the use of indicative or subjunctive follows automatically from the predicate frame or illocutionary frame selected by S. The subjunctive can be said to be the marked member of the pair, not only because it is used less frequently, but also because mitigation affects all inflected forms in a clause, as in (183), whereas reinforcement does not:

- (184) Es imposible que venga (S) mañana (Neutral)  
 ¡Que es imposible que venga (S) mañana! (Reinforced)  
 'It's impossible that he will come tomorrow (!)'

Reinforcement is expressed through the addition of *que* and is not reflected in the use of mood, whereas mitigation is expressed through the use of the subjunctive.

It was argued in 3.2.2.3 that the alternation of mood in subjectively modalized contexts is the result of the absence or presence of mitigation. Since in this context too Spanish mood cannot therefore be said to give expression to some modal distinction, one might say that the category 'mode', understood as modality expressed through grammatical means, is absent in Spanish.

Some other contexts in which the indicative and subjunctive alternate have been presented in 3.2.2.1 and 3.2.2.2. In both

cases the different underlying structures assigned to the alternating sentences, representing their *de re* and *de dicto* interpretation, obligatorily combined with positive truth commitment of S in some cases, account for the appearance of both moods. The use of the indicative and subjunctive in relative clauses restricting specific term variables has been interpreted as conditioned by the same rules which account for their use in (qualified) declarative sentences. The use of both moods in factive complements governed by a predicate of subjective feeling remains to be discussed here.

It was argued in 3.3 that in the latter context the Topic/Focus distinction is reflected in the use of the subjunctive or indicative respectively. The indicative may be said to be the marked member of the pair. It is used far less frequently and cannot appear in other factive complements, such as those governed by a verb of causation. As the notion of truth, underlying the alternating uses of mood discussed so far in this chapter, is irrelevant in the case of factive complements, the indicative/subjunctive opposition is free to fulfil a different function. Comparing now the use of the indicative in this context with its use in the only other context in which the alternating use of mood can be said to add to the meaning of a sentence, i.e. its use in non-mitigated declarative sentences, the definitions of focus and declarative shed some light on the relation between these uses:

FOCUS: '... Focus will be assigned to those constituents which present information bearing upon the difference in pragmatic information between Speaker and Addressee, as estimated by the Speaker. (i.e., on the pragmatic information which the Speaker assumes is not shared by Speaker and Addressee ...).' (Dik 1978:149)

DECL: 'S wishes A to add the content of the linguistic expression to his pragmatic information.' (Dik in prep.)

Again, there are both coinciding and differentiating elements in the triggering conditions for the indicative: FOCUS and DECL coincide in as far as in both cases S acts upon the assumption

that the information contained in the predication is new to A; they differ in as far as in the case of DECL S intentionally wants A to take into account the information contained in the predication restricting (X) in his future behaviour, whereas in the case of Focus assignment to factive complements, S presupposes that the SoA designated by the predication restricting (x) is new to A. In the latter case it is S's subjective feeling about this SoA that he wants A to take into account in his future behaviour.

Consequently, in those cases in which the indicative and subjunctive can be said to add to the meaning of a sentence, S has to answer the following questions:

- (i) Whether or not he wishes to express his reservation with regard to his assertion, as reflected in mitigation of a declarative sentence;
- (ii) Whether or not he judges part of his (referential) knowledge to be unshared by A, as reflected in Focus assignment to a factive complement.

These questions relate to two kinds of general distinctions which have been made in this paper to account for the alternating and non-alternating uses of mood in Spanish: the distinction between different layers of the clause as representing the different subacts of a speech act; and the distinction between non-factive, factive and semi-factive complements as representing a SoA under evaluation, an identifiable referent and a unit of S's knowledge respectively.

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