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Illocutionary Function and Functional Illocution
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1. Introduction[*]

In recent proposals concerning the representation of utterances in Functional Grammar, illocutionary force is represented at the highest level of the layered clause structure, having the proposition in its scope.[1] As is rightly stressed by Dik (1989: 254), communication does not consist in displaying propositions but in performing speech acts, which include, in addition to a proposition, the speaker's communicative intentions with respect to the propositional content expressed. This is what Hengeveld (1989: 128-129; 1990), following Halliday, calls the interpersonal level of the utterance. The incorporation of illocution in the underlying representation enables us to account for those properties of utterances which express the speaker's illocutionary intentions with respect to the propositional content.

On the other hand, the actual illocutionary force which an utterance is intended (by the speaker) and interpreted (by the addressee) to have in a given context is determined by contextual and situational factors as well. This means that illocutionary force is an aspect of language that is to be treated both in a (functional) grammar and in a wider theory of verbal interaction: the grammar will have to account for illocution to the extent to which it is coded in a linguistic expression, whereas the wider theory of verbal interaction will have to analyse how the illocution expressed relates to the intention of the speaker and the interpretation by the addressee in a given context and situation.

One of the problems, then, to be dealt with in a functional analysis of illocution is the question of to what extent illocutionary force can be considered as actually coded in linguistic expressions and at which point a pragmatic analysis should take over the job. The answer crucially depends on the question of which properties of utterances are to be taken into account as contributing to the expression of the illocutionary force. In this respect, accounts of illocution, both within Functional Grammar and elsewhere, tend to contrentrate primarily on sentence type without paying enough attention to other, semantic, lexical and intonational indications of the illocutionary force. As a consequence of this approach, the illocutionary force that an utterance is intended (and interpreted) to have is in some

cases too readily and unnecessarily considered not to be expressed in the utterance itself, or at any rate not directly.[2] In this paper I will argue for a more integrated approach in which the expression of illocution is treated in terms of the interaction of the sentence type with semantic and lexical illocution-indicating properties of utterances.[3]

My paper is organised in the following way. The first part (section 2) consists of a critical discussion of recent proposals concerning the treatment of illocution in Functional Grammar. In this section a number of the problems are discussed that result from a too predominantly sentence type-oriented approach. In the second part I will discuss, as an illustration of a more integrated approach of illocution, three types of linguistic expression in which the illocutionary force is expressed by a combination of lexical and semantic means and the sentence type (section 3). In the concluding section, I will briefly indicate some of the consequences of this approach for the representation of illocution in Functional Grammar.

2. The treatment of illocution in Functional Grammar

2.1   The dichotomy between illocution and proposition

The various proposals concerning the representation of illocution in Functional Grammar (cf. note 1) exhibit a common general structure, which in fact goes back to Searle (cf. Hengeveld 1988: 240-241). This general structure can be represented as:

(1)   ILL (proposition)

In the proposals of Moutaouakil, Dik and Vet, ILL represents an illocutionary operator which operates on the proposition and accounts for the formal and semantic properties of a linguistic expression that are due to its illocutionary force. Hengeveld proposes, mainly for model-technical reasons (cf. Hengeveld 1987: 242), to represent illocution in terms of an abstract illocutionary frame, into which the proposition, representing the content of the speech act, is to be inserted. Hengeveld's illocutionary frame expresses the relationship between the speaker, the addressee and the proposition: it contains instructions for the addressee as to what the speaker wants him to do with the content of the speech act.

Within Hengeveld's layered clause model, subscribed to by Dik (1989) and Vet (1990), the dichotomy between illocution and proposition informally represented under (1) imposes some restrictions on the type of linguistic element that may be analysed as contributing to the expression of the illocution.[4] Elements belonging to the proposition, which encompasses the fully specified extended predication, cannot be analysed as contributing to the expression of the illocution, and vice versa. This dichotomy is not problematic in the case of less central illocutionary elements, such as (modal) adverbs, particles and parenthetical expressions, which can simply be analysed as belonging to what Vet calls the illocutionary domain and not to the proposition. However, if the illocutionary force is expressed by elements that are more crucially integrated in the predication, such as e.g. explicitly performative matrix predicates, cf. (2a), or *let's* in (2b), the analysis can be expected to give rise to problems.

(2) a. I order you to leave this room immediately
     b. let's go to the movies tonight

If the matrix predicate in (2a) and *let's* in (2b) are analysed as belonging to the propositional domain, one cannot fully account for the illocutionary information expressed in the utterance. If, on the other hand, they are analysed as not belonging to the proposition but to the illocutionary domain, we are left with a predication that is not complete. Moutaouakil (1986), Hengeveld (1990) and Vet (1990) choose the latter solution, without indicating, however, how the propositional content should be represented in the case of an utterance like (2a) or (2b). The former solution is adopted by Dik (1989). His approach is connected with the emphasis on the sentence type as the primary indicator of illocutionary force, which will be discussed in the next section. I will come back to the analysis of sentences like (2a) and (2b) in section 3.

2.2   Sentence type

In all proposals concerning illocution within Functional Grammar, illocutionary force - whether represented as an operator or as a frame - is primarily associated with sentence type. Dik (1989: 256) and Hengeveld (1988: 232-233; 1990) interpret the various sentence types as expressing "basic illocutions". Dik, whose proposal is most explicit on this point, thus gives a functional explanation for the fact that, whereas all possible illocutionary forces can be expressed lexically, only some, "basic" ones, have been grammaticalized: most of the world's languages have declarative, interrogative and imperative sentence types of some sort (corresponding with asserting, questioning and ordering illocutionary force, respectively), and often an exclamative sentence type as well.

It is not entirely clear whether Dik opts for a specific or a more general value of these basic illocutions. His treatment of examples suggests that he associates for instance the imperative sentence type specifically with orders, and not with a directive illocution in general.[5] Moreover, a specific value would seem to be in keeping with his idea of the preferential treatment, in terms of grammaticalization, of some ("basic") illocutions as compared to other ("non-basic") illocutions, which can only be expressed lexically. On the other hand, Dik's paraphrases of the basic illocutions are less specific. Thus, he paraphrases for instance the basic illocution expressed by the declarative sentence type in a rather general way as: "S instructs A to add the propositional content to his pragmatic information" (1989: 256).

In my opinion, one should ascribe to the sentence types as such only a very general illocutionary value. In the case of e.g. Latin and English, this view is supported by the great variety of directive illocutions that are expressed by imperative sentences, ranging from orders to pleas and from stringent advices to suggestions.[6] This points to a non-specific directive illocutionary value of this sentence type, rather than to a specific order illocution. In spoken language, the intonation of imperative sentences plays an important role in further specifying the general directive illocution conveyed by the imperative sentence type.

Furthermore, the basic illocutionary value to be associated with the sentence types should not automatically be considered, in my opinion, as the predominant factor in the expression of illocution, but rather as one factor that may cooperate, in various ways, with other (lexical, semantic

and/or intonational) properties. Thus, it is the combination of the declarative sentence type with the first person, present tense form and the lexical meaning of the matrix predicate that expresses an illocution in a performative sentence like (2a).

2.3   Modification and conversion

In the proposals of Dik (1989), Hengeveld (1988; 1990), and Vet (1990), various ways of expressing more than just the basic illocutions are discussed. Two distinct types of process are mentioned in this connection, namely "illocutionary conversion" (mainly discussed by Dik, 1989: 257-258) and "modification".

By conversion Dik means a change of the basic illocution. He distinguishes three ways of converting the basic illocution, namely:
(i) grammatical, (ii) lexical, and (iii) pragmatic illocutionary conversion.

(i) Grammatical illocutionary conversion refers to a change of the basic illocution effected by grammatical means, such as intonation, expressions like *please*, modal particles and tags. An example of grammatical illocutionary conversion is (3), in which the tag *isn't she* serves to convert what Dik calls a basic declarative illocution into a derived interrogative illocution (Dik 1989: 257):

(3)   She is a nice girl, isn't she ?

This type of conversion will have to be represented as such in the representation of the clause. Dik interprets the tag in (3) as a kind of operator which operates on the declarative basic illocution operator. Together they form a complex illocution operator, as is indicated under (4), which contains Dik's representation of (3):

(4)   [INT < Tag [DECL]] E_1: [she is a nice girl] (E_1)

(ii) Lexical illocutionary conversion of the basic illocution takes place, according to Dik, when the speaker makes his illocutionary intention explicit by lexical means, such as e.g. performative formulas (both parenthetical and matrix predicates). An example is (2a), repeated here as

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(5a), which is treated by Dik as a lexical expansion of (5b).

(5)   a. I order you to leave this room immediately
      b. leave this room immediately

Unlike grammatical conversion, lexical illocutionary conversion is not directly represented as such in the underlying representation. Instead, Dik assumes, e.g. in the case of performative sentences, some sort of inferential process on the basis of the lexical meaning of the performative predicate together with the reference of the first person present tense verb to the actual speech situation.

(iii) Pragmatic illocutionary conversion applies in all cases in which the intended illocutionary force is not expressed as such and differs from the illocutionary force that is expressed. An example is the use of a declarative assertion like (6) when the illocutionary intention of the speaker is to request the addressee to turn on the heating. According to Dik, this type of illocutionary conversion is to be treated in a theory of verbal interaction, not in the grammar.

(6)   It is cold in here

Modification is discussed most extensively by Hengeveld (cf. Hengeveld 1988: 256-261; 1989: 140). According to his definition, it denotes the mechanism of modifying the force of the basic illocution of a linguistic expression so as to make it fit the speaker's communicative strategy. The modification can be either a reinforcement of the basic illocution, in order to impose the speech act more strongly upon the addressee, or a mitigation, in which case the force of the speech act is reduced. Hengeveld represents the modification of the basic illocution by means of an illocutionary operator (p_4), which operates on the abstract illocutionary frame, cf. (7).

(7) p_4 . ILL (S) (A) (X_I : [proposition] (X_I))

As an illustration, Hengeveld discusses the reinforcing use of the Spanish subordinator *que* in main clauses, exemplified under (8). As a reinforcing device *que* can be used in combination with all sentence types. In (8), the combination of *que* with an interrogative basic illocution yields an emphatic

question.

(8) ¡que si   vienes   mañana! (1989: 140)
     that whether come.Pres.Ind.2sg tomorrow
     "are you coming tomorrow ?!"

Vet uses the notion modification in a very broad way, which more or less covers both Hengeveld's modification and Dik's illocutionary conversion. Thus, he uses it e.g. for the mitigating use of the future tense in a polite question like (9), but also for lexical means expressing the illocutionary force, like the performative formula *I order you* in (5a). He proposes to represent both lexical and grammatical modifying devices as an operator (δ_0) on the illocutionary operator ILL which represents the sentence type, cf. (10).

(9)   ce   sera   tout ?
      that will-be all
      "that will be all ?"

(10) δ_0 . ILL (X_I : [proposition] (X_I))

As will be clear from this brief discussion, the notions illocutionary conversion and illocutionary modification are used, at least by Hengeveld and Dik, to denote two distinct processes, the former a change of the basic illocution and the latter a reinforcement or mitigation of the pragmatic effects of a given (basic) illocution, without changing it. According to Dik (1989: 258), the various strategies for the modification of illocution are typically applicable across all sentence types. This is for instance the case with the Spanish reinforcing operator *que* discussed above, which can be used in combination with all sentence types. Strategies for illocutionary conversion, on the other hand, are usually sentence type-specific. This is e.g. the case with tags like *isn't it*, which can only be used in combination with a declarative sentence, or *will you*, which can only be used in combination with an imperative sentence.

In theory, such a distinction between illocutionary conversion and modification may seem useful. However, in practice the two processes overlap. For instance, some illocutionary modifiers are, in view of the type

of speech act they prototypically modify, indications of the nature of the speech act as well, and could thus be regarded as converters as well as modifiers. An example is the Dutch particle *even* (literally "for a moment"), which in fact does no more than mitigate (i.e. modify) a request illocution and can be used both in imperative sentences (11a) and in *can you* requests (11b). However, *even* is treated by Dik as a grammatical illocutionary converter, because it prototypically modifies requests and is, for instance, not compatible with a question interpretation in a sentence like (11b).

(11) a. doe   even   de   deur voor mij   open
        doIMP PART the   door for   me   open
        "open the door for me"
     b. kun je   even   de   deur voor mij   open doen ?
        can you   PART the   door for   me   open doINF
        "can you open the door for me ?"

More or less the same holds for *please*, which is used as a polite expression to mitigate the pragmatic effects of a directive speech act. However, at the same time, it unambiguously expresses the request illocution of the accompanying utterance, which is often an imperative sentence (cf. 12a), but may also be an interrogative (cf. 12b) or a declarative sentence (cf. 12c), or may even consist only of a bare noun phrase (cf. 12d). In (12 b-d), *please* could be described both as an illocutionary converter and as an illocutionary mofifier.

(12) a. give me two pounds of apples, please
     b. may I have two pounds of apples, please ?
     c. I would like to have two pounds of apples, please
     d. two pounds of apples, please

Even in the case of a tag like *isn't it* in (13), one could say that it somehow mitigates (i.e. modifies) the force of the speaker's statement in addition to converting it into a derived interrogative, which sollicits an (affirmative) reaction from the addressee.

(13) the weather is nice, isn't it ?

Therefore, it must be concluded that the distinction between conversion and modification is not as neat as is suggested by Dik.

In addition, a more general objection could be raised with respect to illocutionary conversion. It does not seem to be entirely in keeping with the basic principles of Functional Grammar that a speaker who has developed a certain illocutionary intention would first choose a specific (basic) illocutionary expression which subsequently has to be "converted" into another expression, with another, specific, ("derived") illocutionary meaning.[7] Perhaps such an approach may seem justified if one's only, or primary, goal is to provide a functional explanation (viz. in terms of illocution) for certain formal properties of linguistic expressions (viz. the sentence types). However, the concept of illocutionary conversion is not satisfactory if one's goal is to account for the way in which speakers express their illocutionary intentions.

An approach to illocution that treats sentence type as merely one of the (grammatical) illocutionary expression means, which contributes only in a general way to the expression of illocution and may interact in various ways with other, semantic and lexical, properties of the utterance to express in a more specific way the speaker's illocutionary intentions, can dispense with lexical and grammatical illocutionary conversion. Only in the case of Dik's pragmatic illocutionary conversion one could properly speak of a conversion of illocutionary force. However, pragmatic illocutionary conversion is to be treated in a theory of verbal interaction, not in the grammar.[8]

In this section, I have pointed out some of the problems concerning the treatment of illocution in recent proposals within Functional Grammar. I will now turn to the various ways in which illocution can be expressed.

3. Three illocutionary problems in Functional Grammar

In this section, I will discuss three types of linguistic expression in which semantic and lexical means play an important role in the expression of illocution, namely explicitly performative sentences and metadirectives (3.1), *can you* requests, which are conventionalized but not grammaticalized expressions (3.2), and proposals expressed by *let's*, which is an almost fully grammaticalized expression (3.3). With these three examples I want to illustrate the various ways in which the sentence types may interact with other indications of the speaker's illocutionary intentions.

3.1 Performatives and metadirectives

Performative sentences, a well-known type of expression within speech act theory, and 'metadirectives', their less famous functional counterparts, are linguistic expressions in which a specific illocutionary force is explicitly expressed by means of a matrix predication. The matrix predication thus functions as a kind of illocutionary meta-expression with respect to the embedded clause and may be formulated either from the perspective of the speaker (performatives) or from the perspective of the addressee (meta-directives). Some examples are listed under (14) and (15), respectively.

(14) a. I promise that I'll buy you an ice cream
     b. I advise you to take a taxi
(15) a. tell me what you have decided
     b. note that this ticket is non-transferrable

In the examples under (14), the matrix predication is used to express the speaker's illocutionary intentions with respect to the embedded clause, a promise and an advice, respectively. In the examples under (15), on the other hand, the matrix predication expresses the illocutionary interpretation that is expected from the addressee with respect to the embedded clause, which is thus characterized as a question in (15a) and as an assertion in (15b).[9]

In the case of performatives and metadirectives, the sentence type is not used to express the (basic) illocution of the utterance as a whole: (14b) does not have an assertive basic illocution, nor do (15a) and (15b) have a directive basic illocution. However, the sentence type is not irrelevant for the illocution either. Rather, we could say that the sentence type functions at the illocutionary meta-level, where it interacts with semantic properties (such as tense and person) and the lexical meaning of the verbal matrix predicate. In the case of a performative matrix predication, the illocutionary intention of the speaker is expressed by means of the interaction of the declarative sentence type with the lexical meaning of a verbal predicate designating a speech act, the present tense and a first person agent referring to the speaker. In the case of a metadirective, the illocutionary interpretation expected from the addressee is expressed by means of the interaction of the imperative sentence type with the lexical meaning of a

verbal predicate denoting a (perlocutionary or illocutionary) reaction that corresponds with a speech act, and a second person agent referring to the addressee.

As was mentioned in section 2.1, the representation of these constructions in terms of Hengeveld's layered clause structure is problematic, because the sentence type of the utterance as a whole does not correspond with the illocution that is explicitly expressed. However, even if the model were to be adapted in such a way that the matrix predication can be analysed at the level of the illocution, the representation remains problematic, because in that case the proposition does not consist of an independent (cf. 14a, 15a and 15b), or even fully specified (cf. 14b), predication.

Both performatives and metadirectives can also be used in parenthetical constructions, exemplified under (16):

(16) a. I promise, I will buy you an ice cream
      b. tell me, what have you decided ?

In those cases the performative or metadirective parenthetical expression is used to give a more specific indication of the illocution that is globally expressed by means of the sentence type. With respect to the representation of the illocution, these utterances are less complicated than the sentences under (14) and (15). In the first place, the basic illocution expressed by the sentence type is in accordance with the specific illocutionary force expressed by the parenthetical expression. Secondly, the illocution-specifying parenthetical expression can be neatly distinguished from the proposition, which is expressed by means of an independent clause containing a fully specified predication. As is also proposed by Vet (1990), the parenthetical expression can be represented in the underlying representation as a kind of restrictor on the global illocution expressed by the sentence type.

3.2 *Can you* requests

A second type of linguistic expression to be discussed is the *can you* request, exemplified by (17a). In speech act theory, *can you* requests are usually described as "conventional indirect requests", together with utterances like (17b) and (17c).

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(17) a. can you pass the salt ?
    b. would you mind passing the salt ?
    c. I would like you to pass the salt

Their common use as requests (viz. to pass the salt) is usually explained in terms of a process of inferential reasoning, based on Grice's Cooperative Principle and his maxim of Relevance, together with a dinner table context. The outcome of the inferential process is that a request to pass the salt would be more to the point than a question concerning the addressee's abilities to do so (cf. 17a) or objections against doing so (cf. 17b), or a mere statement concerning the wishes of the speaker (cf. 17c). The conventional use of such expressions as indirect requests in many languages is explained by their reference to the various felicity conditions for requests.[10] In the case of *can you* requests, the explanation is sometimes extended (cf. e.g. Searle 1975, Morgan 1978) with the claim that a "convention of use" is responsible for the use of *can you* requests rather than seemingly synonymous contructions with *are you able to*, cf. (18):

(18) are you able to pass the salt ?

Within Functional Grammar, an inferential type of explanation for the use of *can you* requests is explicitly referred to by Moutaouakil (1986: 3-4) and Hengeveld (1988: 257-259), and implicitly by Dik, who speaks of the use of (17a) as a request in terms of pragmatic illocution conversion, to be accounted for in a theory of verbal interaction. Only when the utterance contains *please*, as in (19a), or in Dutch *misschien* "perhaps" or a particle like *even* (literally "for a moment" cf. section 2.3), as in (19b), Dik considers the request illocution to be actually coded in the linguistic expression, because *please, misschien* and *even* are not compatible with the basic question illocution.

(19) a. can you pass the salt please ?
    b. kun je   misschien/even het   zout doorgeven ?
       can you   perhaps/PART the   salt   pass
       "could you pass the salt ?"

In my opinion, this approach does not do justice to the explicit nature of *can you* as a conventionalized lexical means to express a request illocution.

The explanation in terms of reference to a felicity condition mentioned above is useful in that it may explain why *can you* sentences are so appropriate for expressing requests. However, this should not obscure the fact that they do so in a straightforward way that leaves no questions as to the illocutionary intention of the speaker. In what follows, I will give a number of arguments which, taken together, strongly suggest that *can you* requests should be regarded as direct expressions of the illocutionary intention of a speaker to make a request.

First of all, I want to point out that requests differ from other directive speech acts like orders or pleas in that, in addition to being directive, they intrinsically offer the addressee an option of refusal (however unwelcome). The imperative sentence type in itself does not express this feature; it merely expresses a general directive illocution. Significantly, pleas and supplications, which do not offer an option of refusal, are more often than requests expressed by imperative sentences. One of the possible ways to express a request is to add the option of refusal, by means of an interrogative tag like *will you*, to an imperative sentence, cf. (20a). A second possibility is to express the option of refusal more prominently, in the form of the interrogative matrix predicate *can you*, as exemplified in (20b).[11]

(20) a. open the door, will you
     b. can you open the door ?

As regards the production side of requests, therefore, I regard both *will you* tags and interrogative *can you* matrix predicates as direct and explicit means to express an essential feature of a request illocution. Because this illocutionary force cannot be expressed by means of sentence type alone, it is expressed by means of the (strongly conventionalized) combination of the interrogative sentence type (signalling the 'optional' nature of the directive) with the lexical meaning of the predicate and the second person agent.

However, the alleged indirectness of *can you* requests is usually discussed with respect to the interpretation of *can you* sentences, which may also be used to express genuine questions, like e.g. (21a) and (21b).

(21) a. can you drive a motorbike ?
     b. can you lift a huge pile of books ?

There are two distinctions which determine the addressee's interpretation. In the first place, requests are subject to certain restrictions as regards their propositional content, which they share with other directive speech acts, but which do not hold for questions. One of these restrictions is that the propositional content must refer to specific actions or behaviour. As this is not the case in (21a) and (21b), they will be interpreted as questions and not as requests. The sentences under (22), which do refer to specific actions, on the other hand, will usually be interpreted as requests.

(22) a. can you lift this pile of books from the floor ?
     b. can you drive my motorbike to the mechanic ?

In addition to, or perhaps as a result of, this pragmatic distinction between questions and requests, there is a semantic difference. In questions like (21a) and (21b), the speaker questions, by means of *can you*, the ability of the addressee to perform the actions referred to in the propositional content (i.e. *to drive a motorbike* and *to lift a pile of books*, respectively). In (22a) and (22b), on the other hand, the speaker does not question the ability or the competence of the addressee to perform the actions specified in the propositional content; rather, his main concern is whether it is possible for him to actually perform them on a certain occasion. Significantly, *can you* requests can be mitigated in English by *possibly* and in Dutch by *misschien* "perhaps", and a (less conventionalized) Dutch equivalent of *kun je* "can you" in requests is *zie je kans om* .. "do you have an opportunity to ..", which all point in the direction of possibility rather than ability.

The fact that *can you* in requests does not refer to ability but to possibility, explains - more clearly than a simple convention of use does - why *can you*, but not *are you able to*, is an appropriate expression for a request. An utterance containing *are you able to*, even if combined with a propositional content referring to a specific action, could only be used to express a request in a very indirect way (involving a pragmatic illocutionary conversion based on the addressee's inference that the actual application of his ability is at stake). *Can you*, on the other hand, in combination with a propositional content referring to a specific action, will be unambiguously and directly interpreted as the conventional expression of a request.

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My last argument is of a more formal nature. It is based on the observation made by Hengeveld (1988: 259-260) that the use of the English past tense, like the Spanish past subjunctive, in a *can you* sentence like (23a) is a device to mitigate the force of the speech act. What is mitigated in (23a), however, is not the basic question illocution expressed by the interrogative sentence type, but the request illocution. This means that, from a formal point of view, this request illocution must also be present in the corresponding present tense sentence (23b).

(23) a. could you open the window ?
     b. can you open the window ?

As was observed in section 2.3, the same holds for the use of the Dutch particle *even*, which mitigates the force of a request by trivializing the content as something that does not take much time or effort and presents the request as easy to comply with. It should be noted that, in virtue of its original lexical meaning ("for a moment"), *even* can only be used in small requests for so called free goods, and not in more imposing requests, like e.g. when one asks a friend to look after one's dog for a period of three weeks. Moreover, it can be used with a similar mitigating function in other types of directive speech acts as well, like advice (24a) and invitations (24b).

(24) a. ga even   lekker   rustig   zitten   en   ontspan je
        go PART nicely   quietly sit-down and   relax
        "just sit down quietly and relax"
     b. kom even   gezellig   een borrel drinken
        come PART pleasantly a   drink   drink
        "come and have a nice drink"

In view of this general mitigating character, *even* cannot be considered, in my opinion, as the element that converts the basic question illocution into a request in a sentence like (25); rather, it mitigates the request illocution already expressed by *kun je*.

(25) kun je   even   de   deur opendoen ?
     can you PART the   door open
     "could you open the door ?"

The analysis of *can you* requests as direct illocutionary expressions instead of being pragmatically derived from questions is nicely confirmed by evidence from Classical Latin. In the first place, in Latin *can you* requests are not expressed by means of the verbal predicate *posse* "can/ be able", but by means of the impersonal expression *potin (est)* "is it possible", which makes clear that the speaker is interested in whether the addressee has the possibility to do something rather than whether he is able to. Secondly, *can you* requests are formally distinguished in Latin from *can you* questions by the form of the embedded clause. In the case of a question, *potes(ne)*[12] "can you" is followed by an infinitive clause, cf. (26a), whereas in the case of a request *potin* "is it possible" is followed by a subjunctive clause introduced by the conjunction *ut*, cf. (26b), which is also used in embedded clauses following a verbal predicate of commanding, requesting etc.

(26) a. potes   hoc sub   casu   ducere somnos ?
        can-you this under situation draw$_{INF}$ sleep
        "can you sleep in this situation ?"
    b. potin   ut   abeas ?
        is-it-possible that you-go-away
        "could you go away ?"

In view of these arguments, *can you* requests should be considered explicit expressions of a request illocution, rather than pragmatically converted questions. More in general, it must be concluded that some illocutionary forces - notably requests - have a characteristic direct expression form consisting of a lexical expression in combination with a sentence type which does not express the (basic) illocution of the utterance, but qualifies in a more general way the nature of the speech act. In the case of *can you* requests, the sentence type is used to characterize them as open-ended directives.

In the next section I will discuss *let's* proposals. In this type of fully grammaticalized lexical expression the contribution of the sentence type to the illocution is argued to be even more indirect.

3.3   Proposals

Proposals constitute a subclass of the directive speech acts. They resemble suggestions in that they are attempts, in a non-compulsary way, to get the addressee to undertake a particular action or behaviour. However, the content of a proposal, unlike that of a suggestion, does not exclusively concern the benefit of the addressee, but involves both the speaker and the addressee. Moreover, in making a proposal the speaker commits himself to participating in the action or behaviour proposed in case the addressee complies.[13]

Characteristically, in many languages proposals are expressed by means of some kind of first person plural expression, referring to speaker and addressee(s) together. In some languages, like e.g. French or Latin, proposals can be expressed by purely grammatical means: in Latin by means of a first person plural subjunctive form, cf. (27a), in French by a verb form that is usually included in the imperative paradigm, viz. a first person plural verb form expressed without the otherwise obligatory subject pronoun, cf. (27b). Both expressions belong to the imperative sentence type.[14]

(27) a. redeamus
         let-us-return
         "let's return"
     b. retournons
         let-us-return
         "let's return"

The status of the corresponding expressions in English and Dutch, on the other hand, is less straightforward. In both languages, proposals are expressed by means of a grammaticalized lexical expression, exemplified by (28a) and (28b), respectively:

(28) a. let's go
     b. laten wegaan
         let   wego
         "let's go"

In other persons as well as the first person plural, the English verbal predicate *let* and its Dutch equivalent *laten* are used to express an 'adhortative' illocution, which in many other languages is expressed by means of the subjunctive. This use of *let* and *laten* is grammatically marked by an inversion of verb form and subject pronoun.[15] In English proposals, the expression is further grammaticalized by a contraction of the 'subject' pronoun with the verbform to *let's*. In both languages, the content of the proposal is expressed in the form of an infinitive clause.

Although, strictly speaking, English proposals are fully characterized as such by means of the expression *let's*, the analogy with the Latin subjunctive and the French first person plural imperative form may be an argument to consider *let's* sentences imperative sentences as well. However, the sentence type does not play a predominant role in the expression of the proposal illocution. An analysis of *let's* as a grammatical illocutionary converter of an imperative basic illocution would not be adequate; rather, it is *let's* itself in which the sentence type is expressed. More in general, *let* (and Dutch *laten*) plus verb-subject inversion could be regarded as the grammaticalized lexical expression of the imperative sentence type in the first and third person.

In addition to proposals that are expressed by means of *let's*, one finds proposals expressed by means of *how about* plus a gerund, as exemplified under (29):

(29) how about going to the movies tonight ?

In this case, the illocutionary function of proposal is expressed by means of the conventionalized lexical expression *how about* in combination with a special, elliptical, grammatical form. It is interesting to note that the interrogative sentence type gives these proposals, like it does in the case of *can you* requests, a more open ended character, because it leaves the addressee more explicitly room to give a verbal, positive or negative, reaction than *let's* proposals do.

More in general we could say that, in cases like this, the interrogative sentence type does not express a basic question illocution, but only signals that the addressee is offered the possibility to give a verbal reaction to the (non-question) speech act of the speaker. This explains why the interrogative expressions of a directive illocution (*can you* and *will you* requests, *how*

about proposals) are in general less offensive and more polite than both their imperative and declarative counterparts.

4. Conclusion

The analysis of three types of linguistic expression in which the illocutionary force is expressed by means of the interplay of the sentence type and other properties of the utterance may serve as an illustration of the complex nature of the expression of illocution. The main conclusion to be drawn is that a too one-sided stress on the predominance of sentence type in the expression of illocution may result in an unnecessary assumption of illocutionary indeterminacy or indirectness in cases in which utterances do in fact contain specific and explicit indications of the speaker's illocutionary intention. I do not want to deny that the sentence types are important grammatical means in the expression of illocution. However, their illocutionary value is of a very general nature, which in many cases requires (and finds) additional lexical, semantic and intonational support to express the various specific illocutionary intentions which speakers may convey in their utterances.

The final assessment of the illocutionary force of any utterance in a given context should, of course, be left to a pragmatic theory of verbal interaction. In such an analysis, the illocution as coded in the utterance is checked against the knowledge of the speaker and the addressee (and their assumptions about each other's knowledge) with respect to the context and the speech situation, and their more general extra-linguistic knowledge and assumptions. However, in order for this pragmatic analysis to be successful, it should start from an analysis of the illocution as coded in the utterance that is as specific as possible. Although it has been amply demonstrated that there are significant cross-linguistic regularities with respect to the use of illocutionary strategies in languages all over the world (cf. e.g. the overwhelming evidence in Brown & Levinson 1987), the exact wording of these strategies is in many cases language-specific and as such it deserves registration in the language-specific grammar and/or lexicon.

The complex nature of the expression of illocution may have some consequences for its representation in Functional Grammar, which I will indicate here only very briefly.

(i) The distinction between illocution and proposition (i.e. the content of the speech act) is not necessarily as neat as the representations proposed within Functional Grammar (cf. section 2.1) suggest. The fact that in *can you* requests, *let's* proposals and in some of the performative and metadirective sentences the content of the speech act is expressed by means of an infinitive clause, and in *how about* proposals by means of a gerund conflicts with Hengeveld's view of the proposition as consisting of a fully specified predication. One of the consequences may be that the proposition, representing the content of the speech act at the interpersonal level, should be disconnected, somehow, from the predication, which designates a state of affairs at the representational level.

(ii) Secondly, the role of the sentence type as an illocutionary operator may vary, depending on the presence or absence of other, lexical and semantic indications of the illocution. If no other illocutionary expression forms are present, the sentence type operates directly on the proposition, expressing the global illocutionary force of the utterance as a whole. If, on the other hand, the illocution is expressed for instance by means of a performative or metadirective matrix predication, the sentence type has a more restricted function. In that case it only determines the nature of the illocutionary matrix predication, distinguishing e.g. between a (declarative) performative predication and an (imparative) metadirective. In a third group of cases, like *let's* and *how about* proposals, the function of the sentence type may be even more restricted, expressing only the open ended nature of the speech act. These various relationships that may hold between the sentence type and the other elements that express the illocution must somehow be reflected in the representation.

(iii) A last problem to be solved is whether, and how, the illocutionary properties of conventionalized and grammaticalized expressions like *can you*, *let's* and *how about* should be listed in the lexicon.

The primary purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the complex nature of the expression of illocution and to indicate the problems that are involved in its representation in Functional Grammar. I have not attempted to solve these problems: they should be regarded as further points of research.

Notes

1. Cf. Hengeveld (1988; 1989; 1990), Dik (1989), Vet (1990) and Bolkestein (1990). Earlier proposals concerning the treatment of illocution in a Functional Grammar are found in De Jong (1981), De Schutter and Nuyts (1983), and Moutaouakil (1986).

2. Witness the much-discussed notion 'indirect speech act', used within Speech Act Theory for any sentence whose illocutionary force does not correspond with the illocution prototypically associated with its sentence type. For a critical discussion of this notion, see Levinson (1983: 263-276).

3. For reasons of space and in view of the complexity of the subject matter, the role of intonation (though very important in the expression of illocution) is only touched upon in this paper in a very general way.

4. The layered clause structure is represented by Hengeveld (1988a: 242; 1989: 129) as:

clause

$$(E_I: [ILL\ (S)\ (A)\ (X_I: [proposition]\ (X_I))]\ (E_I)$$

$$(e_I: [Pred_\beta\ (x_I)\ (x_2)\ ...\ (x_n)]\ (e_I))$$

predication

In this representation, E is a speech event variable, X a proposition variable, and e a predication variable (cf. Hengeveld 1988: 243; 1989: 130).

5. By directives I mean roughly the same as Searle (1976), who defines them in his classification of illocutionary acts as attempts by the speaker to get the hearer to do something. This class comprises such speech acts as orders, requests, pleas, advices, suggestions, proposals, warnings etc. However, unlike Searle, I do not include questions (interpreted by Searle as requests for information) in the class of the directives, but rather consider them a separate class of speech acts.

6. Cf. e.g. De Rijcker (1984: 42-53) for an illustration of the various illocutionary functions of the imperative sentences in his corpus of English texts. In Latin comedy, only half of the imperative sentences are orders. According to Haverkate (1988), Spanish imperative

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sentences are also used for a variety of illocutions. However, he observes that there may be cross-linguistic differences in the illocutionary variety of imperative sentences.

7.   In this respect, Hengeveld's suggestion (1988a: 244) of a process of "illocutionary frame formation" taking place prior to the insertion of the predication (or proposition) is more satisfactory from a psycholinguistic point of view. Unfortunately, this suggestion has never been elaborated.

8.   It should be noted that such pragmatic processes will also be invoked by the addressee in order to interpret the specific illocutionary intentions of the speaker in those cases in which the illocution is only globally expressed by means of the sentence type.

9.   Example (15b) is extensively discussed by De Rijcker, who regards it, however, as "an outstanding illustration of illocutionary indeterminacy: it can be either an assertion or a request depending on whether the illocutionary point or purpose is to commit the speaker to the truth of the proposition expressed by the subordinate clause or simply to draw the addressee's attention to it." (1984: 49).

10. Cf. e.g. Gordon & Lakoff (1971) and Searle (1975). In this respect *can you* requests differ from non-conventional indirect requests, which do not refer to felicity conditions but may nevertheless be used (with success) in the same dinner table context to make a request to pass the salt, such as :
(i)   *is there any salt on the table* ?
(ii) *these potatoes need some salt*

11. Unlike *will you*, *can you* is only marginally used as a tag. As a matrix predication, on the other hand, *can you* is used much more frequently. In literature on politeness phenomena it has been pointed out that *can you* is more polite than *will you*: in the former case, the addressee is offered the possibility to refuse in terms of external circumstances, whereas *will you* more crucially appeals to the addressee's willingness and cooperation. See Butler (1988) for a discussion of the relative politeness of the various tags that are used in English directives.

12. The Latin enclitic question particle *-ne* is not obligatory in questions, cf. ex. (26a).

13. Note that, in actual practice, proposals often have a primarily addressee-oriented character. A nice illustration can be found in Latin comedy, where one not infrequently finds expressions like (i):
(i)   *eamus,   tu*
     let's-go, you
     "hey you, let's go"

14. I follow Pinkster (1988: 290; 298-305) in including the directive uses of the Latin subjunctive in the imperative sentence type, because, in the case of negation, the negation particle *ne* is used, which is characteristic of imperative sentences. In the non-directive uses of the subjunctive, (e.g. the so-called coniunctivus potentialis), negation is expressed by means of the negation particle *non*, which is characteristic of the declarative and the

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interrogative sentence type.

15. In Dutch, the regular subject pronoun *we* "we" is used. In English, the object case form *us* is used, which refers, however, to the agent, cf. Quirk et al. (1985: 829): "First person imperatives can be formed by preposing the verb *let* followed by a subject in the objective case." . Quirk et al. regard *let* as "no more than an introductory particle" which "should be kept separate from the ordinary 2nd person imperative of *let* as a transitive verb" (1985: 830). Cf. De Rijcker (1984: 15-18) for a more detailed discussion of the exact status of *let* and *let's*, and (ibid., 101-103) for the use of *let's* in a corpus of spoken English texts.

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