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Louis Goossens
University of Antwerp

M. J. P.

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Louis Goossens
(University of Antwerp)
Departement Germaanse UIA
Universiteitsplein 1
2610 Wilrijk-Antwerpen
Belgium

1. Introduction

Whereas the copula in general, and English **be** in particular, has received a good deal of attention within the framework of Functional Grammar (see, inter alios, Dik (1983), (1985) and (1989), Hengeveld (1986), (1987) and (1992), Keizer (1992), and Goossens (1992)), **have** has never been dealt with systematically. Its treatment is virtually restricted to its use as the expression of Perfect aspect (see Dik (1989), and Olbertz (1992) on the grammaticalization of Spanish **haber**).

In this paper I will try to confront a number of problems raised by a more comprehensive account of English **have** within the theory of FG. Of necessity, I shall only be able to deal with some of the questions that are raised by such a confrontation. Indeed, as Anna Wierzbicka (1982: 755) put it, "Have is a ubiquitous verb in English. To examine all its different uses and functions would require several bulky volumes".

A question that naturally forces itself upon us in the framework of FG is whether **have** is a predicate in its own right, i.e. whether it has to appear in the underlying representations with its own argument structure. This question will be rephrased in terms of the notion *graded predicationality*, as defined in Goossens (1992). This will be the subject of section 3.

Having decided there that **have** can be fully predicational, in other words, that in some of its uses it is to be considered as a full-scale predicate, I will next face the question (in section 4) how fully predicational **have** figures in the typology of states of affairs as envisaged by FG, where we shall not be contented with a simple, or should we say simplistic, classification as a state. It will be found that a refinement of the FG apparatus of semantic functions will allow us to bring out how the multi-varied range of senses exhibited by predicational **have** hang together. In this context I will make restricted use of the concept of complex/radial network as it figures in Cognitive Linguistics and which, though it is not a feature of current FG work, can without problems be made compatible with the framework of Functional Grammar.

Next, it will be found that a number of (other) uses of **have** are **semi-predicational**, which implies that it is used to form derived complex predicates for which another predicate serves as input. In section 5 an initial account of these semi-predicational uses is provided.

Before we tackle these three FG-specific questions, a preliminary account is offered in section 2, for which we first draw on Brugman's study of **have** within the framework of Construction Grammar (Brugman 1988). This will provide us with a survey of the uses that **have** exhibits in Present-day English (including a statement about whether they can all be assigned to one, obviously polysemous item), of its construction types, and of its sense differentiation as Brugman views it. In addition two points will be tackled which are also primarily in line with a Cognitive Linguistic approach, but compatible with an FG treatment, viz. that of a schematic meaning that unites all the uses of **have**, and the question whether a prototypical centre can be posited for the different uses and senses of our verb. All these issues are a prelude to our partial FG account in sections 3, 4 and 5. Since, moreover, I will not address all the dimensions that are actualized by this introductory discussion, it will also serve as an indication of what a fuller treatment of **have** in a Functional Grammar of English would have to cover.

Note that FG terminology (e.g. **predicate**, **predication**, **operator**, **predicate formation**, **First argument**) is used in accordance with Dik (1989), unless otherwise stated. The same goes for the way we understand the semantic functions or the parameters characterizing states of affairs employed in sections 4 and 5.

2. A 'ubiquitous' verb

2.1 Survey

The instances in (1) give a survey of the different senses and construction types in which **have** is found in Present-day English. They come from a variety of sources (or are modelled on examples found in them), including Quirk et al. (1985), the LDCE, Kirchner (1952), and especially Brugman's monograph on **have** (Brugman 1988). The order in which they occur reflects the arrangement into **predicational** uses (1- 13), **semi-predicational** ones (14-22), and **minimally predicational** one (23). This arrangement will not be justified here but in section 3, since it is one of the FG-specific questions that we want to address in this paper. The numerals (1-24) will be used for further reference in the rest of this paper.

- (1)
1. Jill has a new car.
 2. Jack has a business company of his own.
 3. Jill has brown eyes.
 4. Jack has three daughters.
 5. The house has seven windows.
 6. The problem has several dimensions.
 7. Jill has a cold.
 8. Jack has serious doubts.
 9. The Scots have more positions of influence than anyone else.
 10. I'm not having any more of your nonsense.
 11. Jill is having a baby in September.
 12. We are having a party next week.
 13. One theory has it that the U.S. wants to prevent the contract from being signed.

 14. Jack had a drink before he left.
 15. (i) The patrol had two men killed.
(ii) We'll have the roof fixed.

16. (i) I have an aunt coming on Sunday.
(ii) He had them rolling in the aisles.
(iii) We can't have you going everywhere by taxi.
17. (i) I had John find me a new house.
(ii) She has children come to her house every Sunday.
18. (i) I have a tooth missing.
(ii) I'll have it ready by tomorrow.
(iii) The play has him lonely and old when he dies.
19. (i) I have \$5 in my pocket.
(ii) The shelf has several books on it.
(iii) He had her by the hand.
(iv) I'll have your cat down (the tree) in a minute.
20. (i) No one will have this person as a chairman.
(ii) Immelda's count has Ferdinand ?(as) the victor.
21. (i) I have my husband to keep honest.
(ii) I have my husband to keep me honest.
22. (i) You'll have to wait.
(ii) There had to be some solution ('logical necessity').
(iii) You have to be joking ('epistemic'; esp. Am.E.)
23. Jack has phoned.
24. (i) I'd rather go myself ('would willingly').
(ii) He'd better do it ('ought to, should')

A preliminary question is whether all these instantiations illustrate the same lexical item. I would like to argue that they do, except for (24). In that usage, the contracted form is virtually obligatory, and constitutes a conventional unit together with *rather* and *better* respectively. There may even be some doubt whether 'd is short for *would* or for *had*, especially in 24(i) (see, for example, Visser (1970: 32-34)). Moreover, 'd is often left out in (24ii), which points to the fact that its meaning contribution is minimal; it cannot, for that matter, be brought in line with the schematic meaning that I will posit for the other uses of *have*. For all these reasons, I will not

consider these cases any further in what follows.

The other instantiations are taken to belong together as polysemous realizations of *have*, even if in certain cases the link between them is somewhat tenuous. Especially the usage in the formation of the perfect tenses (23) and the combination *have to* (22) might be considered to stand somewhat apart. Indeed, besides its specific meaning contribution, 'perfect' *have* shows higher contractibility (in casu the capacity to occur in phonologically reduced forms as an enclitic to the immediately preceding subject), and is the only case in our set where *do*-support, which is at least optional, and often obligatory in the other uses, is impossible. *Have to*, on the other hand, exhibits some degree of phonological fusion between *have* and *to* ([hæftv], and not [hævtv]), which sets it apart from the other usages of *have*, and, of course, has a specific meaning profile of its own as well. Still, I would like to stick to the polysemy position, because of the (large degree of) identity of the conjugational forms in all these uses, and, more importantly, because they can all be said to share one schematic meaning (in the sense of Langacker (1991)). Note that a similar position is adopted by Brugman (1988: 25-26). What the schematic meaning amounts to will be discussed in subsection 2.5.

2.2 A prototypical meaning

Although with respect to frequency the use of *have* in the perfect tenses by far outnumbers any of the other usages, and in spite of the extremely wide range of constructions that it otherwise exhibits, there appears to be a fair amount of agreement on accepting *possession* as its prototypical meaning.

This is indeed the meaning that is often listed first in monolingual dictionaries (Webster's, Heritage, Collins English Dictionary; but not in Cobuild, for example, whereas LDCE has separate entries for the auxiliary of the perfect tenses and the 'full' verb). It was the sense that was offered first by two (British) native speakers I consulted, in reply to the question

what they regarded as the most typical meaning to be associated with the verb; and it is the sense associated with such nominalizations as **the haves** and **the have-nots** ('the rich and the poor'). Brugman (1988) assigns possession a basic position in her Lexical Network treatment of **have**. She speaks of "the prototypical, basic-level and recurrent possession relation, which can be thought of as the paradigm use of **have**" (p. 245).

It must be pointed out, however, as Langacker (1991) has emphasized, that "the linguistic category of possession does not reduce to any single, familiar value, such as ownership" (p.169). In other words, if we prototypically associate **have** with possession, we think in terms of a somewhat vaguely outlined concept, whose inner core is ownership in the strict sense of the word (illustrated in use 1), but which also extends to such uses as 2.

2.3 Construction types

For a survey of the construction types that are relevant to **have**, we can turn to Brugman (1988: 22-24). I have arranged them in the order of my exemplification under (1). The notation, which is largely that employed by Brugman, should be interpreted as follows:

- NP₁ = subject NP
- NP₂ (if present) = 'object' NP
- V_{en} = past participle
- V_{ing} = ing-form
- V- = bare infinitive (infinitive without to)
- AP = adjective (phrase)
- PP = prepositional phrase (including 'adverbial particles')
- V_{to} = to-infinitive
- **that-cl** = finite subclause introduced by **that**

In (2) the symbols between brackets include a numeral denoting the total number of complements (including the subject in this

count), and, after the full stop, a specification of the phrasal type and the morphological marking of the last complement (in unmarked complement order): (3.AP) stands for 'three complements including the subject NP, last complement adjective phrase'.

(2)

- a. NP₁, NP₂ (2.NP)
Jill has a new car
- b. NP₁, *it*, **that-cl** (3.**that-cl**)
One theory has it that the U.S. wants to prevent the contract from being signed
- c. NP₁, NP₂, V_{en} (3.VP_{en})
We'll have the roof fixed
- d. NP₁, NP₂, V_{ing} (3.VP_{ing})
I have an aunt coming on Sunday
- e. NP₁, NP₂, V- (3.VP-)
She has children come to her house every Sunday
- f. NP₁, NP₂, AP (3.AP)
I'll have it ready by tomorrow
- g. NP₁, NP₂, PP (3.PP)
I have \$5 in my pocket
- h. NP₁, NP₂, (*as*) NP (3.NP)
Immelda's count has Ferdinand ?(*as*) the victor
- i. NP₁, NP₂, V_{to} (3.VP_{to})
I have my husband to keep honest
- j. NP₁, V_{to} (2.VP_{to})
You'll have to wait
- k. NP₁, V_{en} (2.VP_{en})
Jack has phoned

For a thorough discussion of these different construction types we refer the reader to Brugman (1988). Our own account within the framework of FG will be restricted to the issues outlined in the introduction, but it is clear that all these constructional possibilities should receive attention in a full-scale treatment of our verb in a Functional Grammar of English.

2.4 Sense differentiation

There are various ways to deal with the sense differentiation that characterizes **have**. Again the most insightful one that I have come across is to be found in Brugman (1988). I restrict myself here to a brief survey and exemplification of the (fairly abstract) sense distinctions that she found to be relevant. Note that these senses cut across the uses grouped as 1-13 and 14-22 above; they will be confronted briefly with our attempt to bring out the coherence among the predicational uses of **have** presented in section 4, but, as will be pointed out there, can only be fully evaluated when all the semi-predicational uses are drawn into the picture (something which I will leave as a topic for further study). The instances for (i)-(v) are Brugman's (p.24).

(3)(i) Existential-attributive:

- I have \$5.
- The shelf has several books on it

(ii) Affecting event:

- I had my bicycle stolen

(iii) Resultant state/event:

- I had them climbing the walls

(iv) Causative:

- I had them bring chips to the party

(v) Depictive

- The movie had him dying in the end

(vi) 'partake'

- We're having a party next week

2.5 Schematic meaning

Since we have posited that the uses listed under (1) as 1 to 23 have enough in common to be dealt with as belonging to one polysemous item, it should be possible to come up with a single schematic meaning (as understood by Langacker (1987) and (1991)). Given the diversity of senses and construction types, and the

overall abstractness of the meaning contributed by **have**, we expect this schematic meaning to be of a highly abstract nature. Brugman offers the relation of 'interest' as the common denominator of meaning for all uses of **have**, but in my opinion that does not adequately cover such cases as 5, 6 and especially 23.

Rather then, I would like to propose **asymmetrical attribution** as the meaning that can be generalized over all the uses of **have**. What I mean by this is that **have** establishes a relationship between the entity denoted by the NP₁ (the First Argument in FG terms) and something else. This 'something else' is (i) the Second Argument (in uses 1-14, where we take the it in 13 as an expression phenomenon), (ii) the combination of the NP₂ and the final 'complement' (in instances 15-21), (iii) the **to**-infinitive in use 22 (**have to**), or (iv) the past participle (with its complements) in the perfect tenses (23). The relation is **asymmetrical**, because the First Argument has some degree of precedence over the Second Argument or over the combination NP₂-final complement: it possesses the Second Argument, experiences it, is the 'whole' on which the Second Argument depends for its existence, brings it about (note that asymmetrical attribution would be part of the schematic meaning of other two-place predicates; but for other verbs than **have** some extra meaning ingredient would have to be added to make the schematic meaning complete). In 22 this asymmetry is the involvement of the NP₁ in the obligation signalled by the **to**-infinitive, or the fact that it triggers the inference embodied in the infinitival complement. In the perfect tenses the asymmetrical relation is at its most schematic, in that the state expressed by the past participle is somehow dependent for its existence on the First Argument; this accounts for the difference between (4) and (5).

(4) Jack has gone

(5) Jack is gone

In both cases the state expressed by the past participle **gone** is attributed to **Jack**, but, whereas in (5) the attribution as

expressed by **be** is purely 'ascriptive' (in the sense of Goossens (1992: 58)), the attribution in (4) is understood as dependent on some sort of crucial involvement of his (in casu, his agentive involvement), in other words, it is **asymmetrical**. Note that this account of perfect **have** is in line with what I have defended earlier as a position in connection with **be** (Goossens 1992: 58-59), viz. that although **have** is taken in FG to be an expression phenomenon triggered by the presence of the operator Perfect in the underlying representation, it is not meaningless, but adds its own (highly schematic) meaning to the resulting Perfect tense combination. It is also in this sense that I will take it to be **minimally predicational**, rather than **non-predicational**, a position which again parallels that for **be** in Goossens (1992).

Armed with these insights, we now tackle the first of the three questions that were put forward in the introduction.

3. Graded predicationality

A first crucial question concerning **have** in a Functional Grammar perspective is to what extent it is predicational, i.e. to what extent it must be taken to be an independent predicate with an argument structure of its own. As I have argued in Goossens (1992), predicationality is a graded property of verbal predicates, involving (minimally) three degrees, as presented in scale (6).


(6) *Predicational scale*

Fully predicational > Semi-predicational > Minimally
predicational

The three points on this scale correspond to (i) full verbs, which have their own predicate frame, (ii) semi-auxiliaries, which combine with other predicates and where both the semi-

auxiliary and the combining predicate play a role in the determination of the predicate frame, and (iii) **auxiliaries**, which also combine with other predicates, but where the argument structure of the combination is fully determined by that of the combining predicate. Correlating this with the grammaticalization scale which uses FG-specific concepts relevant to the formation of underlying representations, we get the combined scale in (7), where the open end of the <-sign indicates increasing grammaticalization.

(7) *Predicational and Grammaticalization scale combined*



Complex predicate formation is the operation in FG which allows us to construe complex predicates from predicates existing in the fund (see Dik 1989: section 3.2.2); (clausal) **operators** represent grammatical meaning in the underlying representation modifying the predication in the different layers of the layered clause as envisaged by FG.

Have can be taken to occupy each of the three positions on this scale. The most straightforward case, obviously, is that of 'perfect **have**', which is clearly minimally predicational: **have** does not have an argument structure of its own here, nor does it in any way affect the predicate frame of the predicate with which it combines (in the underlying predication of (4), for example, **Jack** is to be assigned the semantic function **Agent** in accordance with the predicate frame for **go**; the combination with **have** in the perfect tenses does not change this). As has already been pointed out in 2.5, **have** is introduced by an expression rule triggered by the phasal operator **Perfect** (see Dik 1989: sections 9.1.2.2 and 15.2.2). In line with what I said about the schematic meaning of **have** above, I would describe the meaning contribution of **have** as asymmetrical attribution of the past participle phrase

to the NP₁ (in FG terms the argument selected as subject in the underlying predication). This position implies that I regard the meaning represented by means of the Phasal Aspect Operator Perfect as the compositional result of the meaning contribution of **have** and that of the past participle morpheme. I will not consider minimally predicational **have** any further, because the essential point about it, in addition to its standard treatment in FG (which I otherwise accept), has been made in subsection 2.5, viz. that it contributes its schematic meaning of asymmetrical contribution to the Perfect tense, even if it is otherwise taken to be an expression phenomenon.

With respect to the other uses, there is little doubt that they come higher on the predicational scale, i.e. that they are not triggered by an operator. As pointed out in section 2.1 none of them has the same degree of contractibility as perfect **have**; following Lehmann (1982) we take phonological reduction to be a sign of increased grammaticalization, in other words, of decreased predicationality. All of them permit at least some degree of **do**-support, which is totally excluded for the perfect tenses; since **do** and perfect **have** are mutually exclusive, we may view this as an argument for assigning to them the same degree of grammaticalization (or: the same amount of minimal predicationality). As far as the meaning of those other uses is concerned, it is as a rule somewhat less schematic than that of perfect **have**, though in some instances it comes close to the fully schematic meaning proposed above.

There are several arguments in favour of considering the uses of **have-to** to be in the transition zone between semi-predicational and minimally predicational. Much depends on whether we are prepared to invest the **to**-infinitive with obligational meaning in one of its uses, a position which I defend in my discussion of **be-to** (see again Goossens 1992: 61-67); accepting this position reduces the meaning contribution of **have**, i.e. makes it more schematic, which correlates with reduced predicationality. Moreover, the fact remains that there is some degree of phonological fusion between **have** and **to**, which indicates that **have-to** may have to be considered in its own

right. Its limited use to express epistemic qualification (use 22(iii)) is another indication that it cannot be fully treated on a par with the other non-operator uses of *have*, and that the three-point scale is not refined enough to accommodate the degrees of grammaticalization exhibited by *have*. With all these qualifications in mind I nevertheless retain it in the extensive group of non-operator *have*, because, as will be argued in 5.4, its combination with another predicate affects the argument structure of the input predicate. But within the group of semi-predicational uses it is certainly the item that comes closest to minimally predicational.

The next task is to decide which of the other uses should be dealt with as fully predicational, implying that *have* is a full predicate with its own argument structure, and which of them are semi-predicational, where *have* is dependent on the combination with some other predicate and is relegated to being introduced by rules of complex predicate formation.

The formal arguments relating to contractibility and *do*-support are not really helpful here. My consultation of two native speakers on the point revealed that *have* exhibits *some* degree of contractibility, but not *has* or *had*. *Do*-support is at least possible throughout, and is considered to be obligatory in 11 (where the progressive forms would sound most natural), 13, 14, 15, 16(i), 17(i), 17(ii), 18(iii), 19(i), 19(iv), 20(ii) by one speaker, and in 1, 13, 14, 15, 16(i), 17(i), 18(ii), 18(iii), 19(iv), 22(ii) by the other. I propose therefore to approach the question solely from the point of view whether *have* in these uses can be taken to predicate independently, or whether it combines with another predication to form a complex predication with an argument structure of its own. Still, the facts about contractibility and *do*-support are an indication that as a full predicate *have* is non-prototypical (which is in accordance with the rather schematic meaning that it exhibits).

My arrangement in (1) reflects this independence (uses 1-13) or dependence (15-22). Although *have* comes with a more or less comparable range of senses (as defined in 2.4) in both groups, there is a crucial difference between them in that in the second

group (15-22), but not in the first, an argument-predicate relation can be established between the NP₂ and the (final) complement, whereas in the first group (1-13) have must be taken to be a two-place predicate. It is for this reason that uses 1-13 are instances of fully predicational have, with the qualification that the fully should be attenuated somewhat because of the formal properties concerning contractibility and do-support noted in the preceding paragraph.

Usage types 15-22, on the other hand, will be taken care of in FG in terms of predicate formation, which implies that I treat have as semi-predicational, and with the qualification that the formal properties (the facts about do-support and contractibility) tend to upgrade some of these uses from the point of predicationality (for example use 15(ii)), or downgrade others (notably those with have-to under 22). In all these instances, the best way to understand the contribution of have is to take it as combining with another predicate which enters the combination with its own argument structure, but where the new combination with have adopts an argument structure of its own, as will be illustrated in section 5. For reasons stated in 5.2, use 14 has been associated with the semi-predicational group, although at first sight have has the appearance of an independent two-place predicate. It will be taken care of by means of a rule of complex predicate formation, though within the range of semi-predicational uses it is closest to the fully predicational ones.

The result of this judgement on degree of predicationality can be summarized in a simplified manner as in (8) (the qualification at this point is mainly that within the group of semi-predicational uses 22 is closer to the minimally predicational position, and that 14 is closest to being fully predicational).

- (8) (Fully) predicational/(full) predicates: uses 1-13
Semi-predicational/complex predicate formation: uses 14-22
Minimally predicational/operator: use 23

4. Predicational *have* and the typology of states of affairs

4.1 Semantic functions

We now turn to the uses which, with some qualification, we have set apart as predicational (1-13), to see how their sense differentiation, as well as the coherence among these senses, can be brought out in the typology of states of affairs (SoAs) of FG.

The following table gives a matrix presentation (of the type argued for by, amongst others, de Groot (1983)) of the predicational uses of *have* in terms of the familiar parameters DYN (dynamicity), TEL (telicity), CON (control), CAUS (causation) and EXP (experience) (see Dik 1989: chapter 5). In addition, I have included POSS (possession), making a distinction between AL (alienable possession or ownership) and INAL (inalienable possession, which covers metaphorical types of 'ownership', such as whole-part, or family relationships), because it is an indispensable ingredient in a characterization of the prototypical use of our verb.

Presence of a feature is signalled by +, absence by -; +/- and -/+ mean that it is weakly present (with -/+ indicating the weaker degree of the two); a blank indicates that the feature is irrelevant. The columns headed by A₁ and A₂ draw the conclusions from the feature analysis with respect to the semantic function of the First and Second Argument, respectively. For the specification of the semantic functions we make use, besides those that are 'standard' according to Dik (1989), viz. Ref(erence), 0 (or Zero), Pos(itioner), Ag(ent), Go(al) and Fo(rce), of Exp(eriencer) as a First Argument (as argued for in Goossens (1990), but otherwise as defined in Dik (1989: 5.2.5)); and of Poss(essor) as a possible First Argument. Poss(M) stands for metaphorical Possessor. Go(Aff) and Go(Eff) mean Affected and Effected Goal, of course, and the / between two semantic functions indicates they are both relevant (but that neither of them has full force). Note that the semantic function Poss(essor) has been made use of in the context of defining relations within terms (see, for example, Dik (1989: 8.6)). Also

that the use of double semantic functions is not unorthodox practice within FG (see again Dik (1989: 5.3.2) and several papers of mine in which I have argued that they are essential if we want to be able to give a refined account of states of affairs within the framework of FG); double semantic functions are especially useful in the context that follows, where we make use of the existing overlaps in the semantic function of the A_1 to bring out the coherence among the predicational uses of **have**. The numbers 1-13 refer to the instantiations in (1), section 2.1.

(9)	DYN	TEL	CON (CAUS)	EXP	POSS AL INAL	A_1	A_2
1.	-	-	-/+	-/+	+	Poss	Ref
2.	-	-	-/+	-/+	+	Poss	Ref
3.	-	-	-	-	+	Poss(M)/0	Ref
4.	-	-	-	-	+	Poss(M)/0	Ref
5.	-	-	-	-	+	Poss(M)/0	Ref
6.	-	-	-	-	+	Poss(M)/0	Ref
7.	-	-	-	+/-		Poss(M)/Exp	Ref
8.	-	-	-	+/-		Poss(M)/Exp	Ref
9.	-	-	+/-	+/-		Poss(M)/Pos	Ref/Go(Aff)
10.	-	-	+/-	+/-		Poss(M)/Pos	Ref/Go(Aff)
11.	+/-	+	+/-	+		Poss(M)/Ag	Ref/Go(Eff)
12.	+/-	-	+/-	+		Poss(M)/Ag	Ref/Go(Eff)
13.	-/+	-	-/+	-		Poss(M)/Fo	Ref/Go(Eff)

Before we try to demonstrate the coherence among these senses on the basis of the schematic meaning in relation to the import of (especially) the First Argument, let us comment briefly on some of the interpretive decisions that are reflected in this matrix.

(i) We have chosen to reserve (unqualified) Poss for instances that signal ownership. Ownership is taken to imply some degree of control; experience may be weakly relevant. That there are several types of ownership is illustrated by the difference

between instances 1 and 2, but also by such cases as (10), where we postulate Poss both for the First Argument (the subject) and for the genitive term (where Jill is the real owner and Jack the one that has the car at his (temporary) disposal).

(10) Jack has Jill's car

(ii) Ref is found throughout in this matrix, in line with the idea that in all its uses have expresses asymmetrical attribution. Ref(erence) is "the second or third term of a relation with reference to which the relation is said to hold" (Dik 1989: 103): in this case it denotes the Second Argument which is attributed 'asymmetrically' to the First; the minimal specification which FG posits for this semantic function is particularly suitable to capture the Second Argument in an asymmetrical attribution relationship as expressed by have. I have 'enriched' Ref by the addition of Go(Aff) or Go(Eff) in 9-13, because there is some degree of control present (for 13 this is causation rather than control, see (v)).

(iii) For all the other instances I take it that they involve a metaphorical Possessor together with some other semantic function. Poss(M) indicates that they are 'possessive' in Langacker's extended sense (see section 2.5), or can be understood as involving a metaphorical mapping of 'ownership possession' onto the instances of asymmetrical attribution at hand. Another way of stating this is that Poss(M) captures the recurrent feature which is to be associated with the schematic meaning that we have identified for have.

(iv) The added specifications reflect loss of the control and experience ingredient in 3-6, increased experience in 7 and 8, increased control in 9 and 10, enhanced control as well as (some) dynamicity in 11 and 12. All of these decisions rely on a fine-grained analysis of the functional relationship between have and its First Argument.

(v) In 13 the Second Argument is propositional and at the same time attributed to and in a way 'caused' (effected) by the First Argument. The First Argument in our instance is understood as

indicating the 'entity' to which the proposition in the **that**-clause is attributed (hence Poss(M)), but also the 'entity' that caused this proposition to come into being (hence the addition of Fo). Note that the A_1 here can also be interpreted as standing metonymically for the human being(s) responsible for what is formulated in the **that**-clause; in an instance like (11) the A_1 would be Poss(M)/Ag anyway.

- (11) This journalist has it that the U.S. wants to prevent the contract from being signed

4.2 Radial organization

Probably the best way to bring out the coherence among the different uses of **have** is to regard them as a complex network (see Langacker 1987) or as a radial category (see especially Lakoff 1987). A full investigation of this sort is beyond the scope of this paper, but certainly not incompatible with the framework of Functional Grammar. As a first step towards the structuring of a radial category, I will provide a brief exploration of the way in which the different SoA types (or subtypes) established in (9) hang together.

The shared element (reflecting the schematic meaning) is possession in the broad sense, i.e. including both ownership and metaphorical possession: in our FG notation this is reflected by the recurrence of Poss or Poss(M) for the First Argument. The prototype is ownership in the narrow sense (the instances in which the A_1 is assigned Poss without (M)), i.e. uses 1 and 2.

The differentiation is reflected in the added specification for the First and (partially) for the Second Arguments (the last two columns in (9)). As I have argued elsewhere (Goossens 1990), it is the semantic function of the A_1 that is the main key to the characterization of the state of affairs (in addition there is a considerable degree of interdependence between the A_2 and the A_1 : Go requires Ag, Fo or Pos for the A_1 ; Ref implies another A_1 than Ag, Fo, Pos). Let us look at the First Argument

specifications one by one.

(i) We understand a prototypical Possessor (uses 1-2) as being involved in a non-dynamic SoA, as having some control over the Ref, and as being to some extent experientially involved, though neither of these ingredients is conceptually salient.

(ii) In instances 3-6 both the control and the experiential element are 'stripped away', hence the addition of Zero.

(iii) In 7 and 8 the idea of (minimal) control is no longer present; at the same time we get a reinforcement of the experiential dimension as reflected in the addition of Exp.

(iv) The next two items (9 and 10), on the other hand, show an increase of the control of the A_1 as compared with the prototype. Since the state of affairs is still non-dynamic, the First Argument is interpreted as Poss(M)/Pos, where Pos(itioner) implies control (and therefore also Experience).

(v) For 11 and 12 we note a change to dynamic together with increasing control (in comparison with 1 and 2), hence Poss(M)/Ag.

(vi) As compared with the prototype, use 13 is weakly dynamic and implies weak causation. We have therefore specified the A_1 as Poss(M)/Fo. Note that for an instance like (11) this would be Poss(M)/Ag (where the implication is that there is some control of the A_1 , as well as some experiential involvement because of this).

Note that this analysis does not run completely parallel with the sense differentiation adopted from Brugman in section 2.4. As was pointed out there, that differentiation cuts across the predicational and the semi-predicational uses. But it is not difficult to establish a number of relationships. The prototype adopted here, as well as extension (ii), uses 3-6 in (1), correlate with the existential-attributive sense; extension (iii), uses 7 and 8, underlies the affecting event sense; extensions (iv) (uses 9 and 10) and (v) (11 and 12) relate to both the resultant state/event meaning and the partake meaning; and extension (vi) (use 13) correlates with the depictive sense. Still, the analysis offered here suggests that a reconsideration

of Brugman's sense differentiation is in order. Since such a reconsideration will have to include the semi-predicational uses, and since I can offer only a partial study of them here, however, I prefer to leave this question for further investigation in the context of another paper.

5. Semi-predicational *have*

5.1 Overview

I have argued in section 3 that uses 14-22, in all of which *have* can be taken to combine with another predication, are considered to be semi-predicational. I therefore propose to deal with them by means of complex predicate formation.

Obviously, there are differences among them. Since a separate treatment of each of them individually is outside the scope of this paper, three different groups will be distinguished: (i) use 14 (the type *have a drink, have a look, have a try*) (which has the appearance of being another use of a two-place full predicate *have*), (ii) uses 15-21 (which exhibit seven different construction types, but also a common denominator in that in all of them we get a three-place construction at the expression level), and, finally, the uses of *have to*, as exemplified in 22.

We deal with each of these in succession in sections 5.2 to 5.4.

5.2 *Have a drink, have a look, have a try*

As pointed out above, *have* in instances like these has the appearance of a two-place predicate, and therefore of a fully predicational verb. They can more adequately be accounted for, however, as derivative combinations which have short verb stems as their input. *Have* combines with these to form complex *have a (deverbal)N* predicates.

This is also the view of Wierzbicka, who provides the most thorough treatment of this construction type (Wierzbicka 1982). She identifies it as "expressions in which *have* is combined with a verb stem of the same form as the stem of the infinitive"; this "excludes expressions like *They had an argument*, or *He had a thought* or a *stomach-upset* or a *good dinner*, in which *have* is combined with a deverbial NOUN. Furthermore, it excludes expressions in which *have* is combined with a deverbial noun even when the noun happens to be identical with the stem of the infinitive, but can be proved to be a noun with a zero suffix, rather than a verb stem functioning as a verb. [...] e.g. *smile*, *cough*, or *quarrel* in *She has a nice smile*; *He has a nasty cough*; *They had a quarrel*" (p. 755). All of these excluded usages belong to predicational *have*.

Yet, in one respect I would not want to go as far as Wierzbicka, who labels the construction as *have* a V. Although the connection with the verb is still obvious, the use of the indefinite article signals assimilation to the category noun; I will therefore characterize the deverbial element as (V-)N.

Wierzbicka distinguishes ten subtypes. For details we refer the reader to her article. What matters here is that these different subtypes share an overall meaning, which we can summarize as follows (for an extensive discussion, see Wierzbicka (1982: 757-762)):

- the construction implies that some action goes on for a limited and in fact rather short period of time; but it cannot be momentary;
- the action cannot have a goal different from the agent himself; it must be either aimless (i.e. without any ostensible purpose), or aimed at some experience of the agent;
- the action must be seen as repeatable.

As was argued in section 3 *have* is taken to have no argument structure of its own in this usage. It comes in as the result of a complex predicate formation rule, with a specifiable class of input predicates. It combines with them to form a complex predicate which is assigned an argument structure and a specific

meaning of its own. This can be formulated in a predicate formation rule like (12).

(12) GENERAL PREDICATE FORMATION RULE FOR HAVE A (V-)N

Input: Verb (x_1)_{AG}

(or) Verb (x_1)_{AG} (x_2)_{GO/REF/DIR}

Condition: V is not marked as formal

Output: have a (V-)N (x_1)_{AG-EXP}

(or) have a (V-)N [+ optional restrictor based on the A_2 of the input V] (x_1)_{AG-EXP}

(where (V-)N indicates a nominal identical to the infinitive of the input V)

Semantic effect: the action is interpreted as predominantly experiential; the experiential action is conceived of as having limited duration (but not as momentary) and repeatable; as aimless or potentially profitable to x_1 .

Rule (12) is intended as a generalization over the different subtypes distinguished by Wierzbicka; it is not particularly difficult to derive more specific rules from it according to subtype. We restrict ourselves here to a couple of instances for which we give an output expression with the input predicate frame between brackets, and, where required, some comment on what happens in the output predication.

(13) He had a walk in the afternoon

(Input: walk_V (x_1)_{AG})

(14) Have a lick of my ice cream

(Input: lick_V (x_1)_{AG} (x_2)_{GO}; the input Goal becomes restrictor of the (V-)N in the output)

(15) Mary is having a look

(Input: look_V (x_1)_{AG} (x_2)_{DIR/GO}; in this instance the A_2 of the input predicate is left out in the output)

5.3 Three-place structures with *have*

Let us now turn to the structures exemplified by 15-21, which, following Brugman (1988), can all be assigned the structural pattern in (16) at the expression level.

(16) NP₁ **have** NP₂ Third Constituent

(where this third constituent can be realized by a range of construction types; in accordance with Brugman and the discussion in section 2.3 they can be labelled as 3.VP_{en}, 3.VP_{ing}, 3.VP-, 3.AP, 3.PP, 3.(as)NP, 3.VP_{to})

The justification for dealing with these structures by means of (complex) predicate formation is as follows. The NP₂ can be understood to be an argument of both the third constituent on its own and of the *have*-third constituent combination; its semantic function can be defined both in relation to this third constituent only and in respect of the *have*-third constituent combination. This can be captured adequately if we take the combination of the third constituent (the predicate of the combination) with the NP₂ (the argument of the combination) as the input of a predicate formation rule, whereas the combined *have*-third constituent combination is the (complex) two-place predicate of the output predicate frame (with the NP₁ and the NP₂ as its arguments).

Note that the input predicate itself will (as a rule) have come about as a result of predicate formation; this would be the case for VP_{en}, VP_{ing}, PP, (as)NP and VP_{to} (only VP- and AP can be used as predicates straight away).

The meaning of the output predicates with *have* varies with the differences in meaning among the Third Constituents which serve as input predicates, as well as with the semantic function of the A₁ of the output combination. In 15(i), for example, this would amount to ascribing the state 'killed' to 'two men', with in turn the (asymmetric) ascription of this combination to the

Experiencer indicated by 'the patrol'. In 15(ii), on the other hand, the state 'fixed' is ascribed to 'the roof', and this combination is asymmetrically ascribed to the Agent 'We' (as a result the construction as a whole signals agentive causation). An explicit formulation of the predicate formation rules for 15(i) and 15(ii) is to be found in (17) and (18).

(17) PREDICATE FORMATION RULE HAVE-3.VP_{EN} ('EXPERIENTIAL')

Input: VP_{en} (x₁)_o

(this presupposes another predicate formation rule that derives the V_{en}, typically from a controlled, or at least caused state of affairs; the resulting past participle is adjectival, hence its argument is characterized as Zero)

Output: have VP_{en} (x₀)_{Exp} (x₁)_{Ref}

Meaning: the A₁ (x₀) is understood as experiencing the state of affairs described by the VP_{en} as happening to the A₂ (x₁). Expression rules will have to take care of the positioning of the VP_{en}.

(18) PREDICATE FORMATION RULE HAVE-3.VP_{EN} ('AGENTIVE')

Input: VP_{en} (x₁)_o

(same remark as for rule (17))

Output: have VP_{en} (x₀)_{Ag} (x₁)_{Go}

Meaning: the A₁ (x₀) is understood as agentively causing the state of affairs described by the VP_{en} to the A₂ (x₁). Otherwise the same as for rule (17).

All the construction types at hand (15-21) can be accounted for in this way, but providing all the details would amount to several additional papers. At this point I would only like to remark that the range of semantic functions can be said to have expanded in comparison to the predicational uses. A partial characterization as Poss(M) does not appear to be necessary any more in most of these instances (note that in predicate formation

rules (17) and (18) I have assigned Exp and Ag to the A₁ (without further qualification); the only uses where Poss or Poss(M) are still relevant are 19 (i), 19(ii) and 21.

Finally, I am aware that my predicate formation rules differ somewhat (though not very significantly) from the predicate formation rule which Dik (1980) proposed for the Dutch *laten*-construction. The advantage of my treatment, it seems to me, is that it provides a more adequate account of the compositional nature of the constructions at hand. Such a treatment allows Functional Grammar to be brought in line with insights formulated in the framework of Construction Grammar (cp. Brugman (1988)) and with the treatment of constructional meaning in Cognitive Grammar as conceived by Langacker. Again, a full demonstration of this point is beyond the scope of this paper, but I would like to posit that such an elaboration of the framework would both be possible and make it more adequate as a functional model of language.

5.4 Have-to

In our discussion of the polysemy/homonymy question (section 2.1), as well as in section 3, where we decided that among the semi-predicational uses *have-to* is closest to the 'minimally predicational' position, we pointed out that the uses illustrated in 22 have divided properties with respect to auxiliarization.

Among the arguments in favour of an auxiliary treatment (and hence as minimally, or more adequately in this case, weakly predicational, to be taken care of by means of an operator in the underlying structures of FG), there is, to begin with, the phonological fusion between *have* and *to* ([hæftʊ]). Secondly, we should note its specialization in typically modal meanings, ranging from obligational (deontic, though not with the implication that the speaker is the authority source), via logical necessity (22(ii), to epistemic, as in 22(iii)

(especially in American English, but increasingly also in British English).

On the other hand, **do**-support is the rule; and the obligational meaning, which is the predominant one, is a natural continuation of the usages under 21 (on this point see Brinton (forthc.), which deals with **have-to** in a diachronic perspective).

Most importantly, the obligational meaning (not the epistemic one; logical necessity is an in-between case) can still be taken to be compositional to some extent, though, obviously, with a considerable degree of conventionalization. The 'ingredients' are, first, the asymmetric attribution meaning that we have identified above as the schematic meaning for **have**, and, secondly, the (constructional) meaning associated with the **to**-infinitive. What this constructional meaning amounts to, I have tried to outline in Goossens (1992) in the context of my discussion of the **be-to** construction. Partially on the basis of a diachronic perspective on the evolution of the **to**-infinitive, but also taking into account how the **to**-infinitive functions as a restrictor after nominal heads, as well as in the **be-to** combination, I posited there that **obligation** and **predestined futurity** are the central meaning contributions of the **to**-infinitive in those usages. Although I certainly do not want to claim that this proposal can be extrapolated to all other uses of the **to**-infinitive in Present-day English, I am convinced that it helps us significantly to understand the main facts about **have-to**. The following predicate formation rule for use 22(i)) relies on this analysis, in that it takes as its input a **to**-infinitive, which itself results from the predicate formation rule formulated as (22) in Goossens (1992: 66). Note that the A_1 in the output is taken to be experientially involved in the obligation, if it is animate.

(19) PREDICATE FORMATION RULE **HAVE-TO** (OBLIGATION)

Input: Verbal predicate_{to} (x₁) ... (x_n)

Conditions: the **to**-infinitive is the result of predicate formation rule (22) in Goossens (1992) with associated expression rule; the **to**-infinitive is taken in its obligational meaning)

Output: **have-to** Verbal predicate (x₁)_{EXP} ... (x_n)

(the x₁ is identical with the x₁ of the input predication, unless we get passivization; the combination indicates that the x₁ is viewed as being involved obligationally in the state of affairs signalled by the Verbal predicate, which entails experiential involvement as well, but only if the x₁ is animate; phonological fusion will take place at the expression level between **have** and **to**, as indicated above)

As I have pointed out, this predicate formation rule deals with obligational **have-to** only. Use 22(iii), epistemic **have-to**, may be assigned minimally-predicational status, and be accounted for by an (epistemic) π_3 -operator (cp. Dik 1989: 206). 22(ii) is intermediary between 22(i) and 22(iii), and might either be dealt with by predicate formation, or triggered by an objective epistemic operator. That a clear-cut solution cannot be proposed should not bother us too much, since it is in the transitional zone between a semi-predicational and a minimally predicational use.

6. Some conclusions

Of necessity, this has only been a partial account of **have** within the framework of Functional Grammar. I hope to have shown, however, that the questions which suggest themselves when we adopt this model have helped us to detect new insights into the ways in which this complex verb is organized.

Among our findings the following may be highlighted by way of conclusion.

(i) As a preliminary to the FG-specific investigation, I have argued (in accordance with Brugman (1988)) that in practically all its instantiations **have** can be taken to be one and the same item, the different uses of which are tied together by at least weak polysemy. Its use for the perfect tenses may stand somewhat apart, but, like the other uses, it can be understood as sharing the schematic meaning of asymmetrical attribution.

(ii) One dimension of its differentiation was captured in terms of graded predicationality. In the fully predicational uses **have** is a two-place predicate with an argument structure of its own, in the semi-predicational uses it combines with another predication and adopts an argument structure for the combination, and in the minimally predicational use (i.e. in the perfect tenses) it has no argument structure of its own. These different degrees are differentiated as full predicates, as structures resulting from complex predicate formation, and as a use of **have** that is triggered by the presence of an operator on the predication.

At least two problematic uses were met with in this context. **Have-to** was found to belong to the transitional zone between semi-predicational and minimally predicational: the obligational meaning can still be taken to be semi-predicational, its incipient epistemic sense as minimally predicational, its logical necessity sense hovering in between. Uses of the type **have a drink**, on the other hand, which appear to be two-place full predicate uses at first sight, were argued to belong to the semi-predicational group (though a rather thin line connects them with such uses as **have a quarrel**, **have an argument**, which belong with

the full predicates). From all this it appears that the three-point scale of predicationality which we used has to allow for transitional cases.

(iii) Further differentiation among the fully predicational uses was effected by looking at them from the point of view of the typology of states of affairs in FG, adopting a refined version of the parameter set involved, as well as of the set of semantic functions operated with. Possession was included among the parameters; as far as the semantic functions are concerned double semantic functions were adopted, as well as Poss(essor) and Poss(M(etaphorical)) to characterize the First arguments.

(iv) The radial network organization of predicational **have** can largely be understood in terms of the coherence that links the (refined) semantic functions of the First Argument to the Possessor A_1 of **have**'s prototypical usage, ownership/possession. Although there is a clear correspondence to the sense differentiation offered for **have** in Brugman (1988), this partial radial category account of predicational **have** suggests that Brugman's sense differentiation will have to be reconsidered. Since this reconsideration will have to encompass all the semi-predicational uses as well, I have to leave it as a subject for further investigation.

(v) The differences among the semi-predicational usages come from the differences among the input predications as well as from those among the semantic functions of the A_1 in the resulting combination with **have**. Complex predicate formation rules provide us with a convenient way to capture the partial constructional fusion that takes place between predications and semi-predicational verbs (as was demonstrated for **have** in a number of its uses).

(vi) Making use of FG's functional apparatus in a flexible manner makes it possible to incorporate insights from both Construction Grammar and Cognitive Linguistics into the framework. It will have been clear, for that matter, that this paper is a (mainly implicit) plea for a more outspoken cognitivist orientation of the FG model.

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